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INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of violence in publicly owned housing develop-
ments is a major problem in the United States today.' This problem
has triggered debates among policymakers, residents, and the general
public as to how best to make these developments safe for their
residents. In Chicago, violence at the publicly owned housing
projects run by the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA)2 has become
a way of life.' Random gunfire is a common occurrence. On the last
weekend in March 1994, for example, police received 300 reports of
shots fired at the sixteen-story Robert Taylor Homes, the most
infamous of the CHA's projects.4 CHA residents, fed up with the
1. See, eg., Michael Abramowitz, Daley Plans Crackdown on riolence Boy's Killing Sparks
'Sweeps'at Projects, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1992, atA3 (reporting that seven-year-old boy's shooting
death sparked search policy to stop "seemingly endless spate of gang violence" In housing
projects); Ruben Castaneda, 14-Year-Old Fatally Shot Near Home. Cabbie Also Among 4 Killed in tw
Distric4 WASH. POST, Sept 12, 1994, at Cl (stating that 14-year-old boy was shot to death on step?
of apartment in District of Columbia public housing development); Serge F. Kovaleski, Drastic
Measures for a Desperate Place. Fences May Mean Freedom at D.C. Housing Complex. WASH. POSTJuly
11, 1994, at D1 (detailing effects of violence on public housing project, including "bullet-
riddled" hallways, walls smeared with dried blood, and graffiti message "Welcome to Your
Death").
2. The Chicago HousingAuthority (CHA) was created under the HousingAuthorities Act,
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 310, para. 2 (Smith-Hurd 1993). The CHA is an Illinois municipal
corporation created "to promote and protect the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
public" through the maintenance of Chicago's low-income housing developments. Id.
3. SeeMemorandum in Support of Request for Authority to Perform Warrantlem Searches
at 2-3, Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth. (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 1988) (No. 88 C 10566); see also
Robert Davis, Judge to Rule on Chicago Gun Sweeps, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 1994, at 3A (describing
fear felt by residents of Robert Taylor Homes and listing examples of random acts of violence);
Tenants See Pros, Cons in Clinton Anti-Crime Plan, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1994, at B7 (reporting
personal stories of residents who witnessed shootings); Don Terry, A Fight for Peace on Chicago's
Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at A8 (describing end of truce among Chicago gangs as reason
for increased violence in Chicago public housing projects). In fact, the rate of murder, criminal
sexual assault, robbery, and serious assault is twice as high in the low-income public housing
developments of the CHA than in Chicago generally. Affidavit of Leroy Martin, Director of
Public Safety for the Chicago Housing Authority at 3, Summeries (No. 88 C 10566).
4. Davis, supra note 3, at 3A; see. e.g., Matt O'Connor & Mitchell LocinJudge Upholds Search
Ban; Clinton Volunteers Help, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 1994, at 1; Don Terry, Chicago Project in Furor
About Guns and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1994, at A12; Terry, supra note 3, at A8,
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violence, have demanded enhanced security measures designed to
make living in the projects safer.5 As a response to this demand, the
CHA initiated a policy of conducting "sveep" searches with the goal
of eradicating the shooting and intimidation that occurs in the
developments.6 Pursuant to the policy, CHA officials conducted
warrantless searches of entire housing developments, searching each
tenant's home to locate weapons used in shootings and removing
those weapons from the property, thereby protecting the people and
property within the development 7 During these sweeps, members of
5. Memorandum of the Chicago Housing Authority and Vincent Lane in Support of
Motion to Modify Consent Decree at 6, Summeries (No. 88 C 10566) (noting that tenants
demanded "vigorous and effective security procedures" to deal with problem of violence in
projects).
6. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 793 (N.D. IlL 1994) (stating that
CHA ordered its police department to conductsweeps after specified violent actions tookplace).
The issue of warrantless searches in CHA developments is not a new one. Sfe Consent Decree
at 3-5, Summeries (No. 88 C 10566). In December 1988, the American Civil Liberties Union filed
a civil rights class action suit on behalf of tenants of the CHA against the CHA, in part, for
violations of the tenants' Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 4. The tenants claimed that the
CHA engaged in "a policy of systematic, warrantless searches of persons, personal effects, [and]
homes... in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id at 3-4. The CHA never admitted that
its policy violated its tenants' Fourth Amendment rights but agreed to enter into a Consent
Decree with the tenants to "avoid[] protracted and costly litigation." d. at 5. The Consent
Decree, in part, allowed the CHA to conduct "emergency housing inspection[s]" when it
developed "reasonable cause to believe that there is an immediate threat to the safety and/or
welfare of tenants and/or employees and/or business invitees and/or property of the CHA."
14 app. B at 1. The purposes of the inspections were to identify any unauthorized occupants
and to "inspect the condition of the units," id. at 6, and not to "enforce, or otherwise to
investigate or obtain evidence of, the violation of any federal, state or local criminal or quasi-
criminal law." I& The Consent Decree allowed the CHA, pursuant to these inspections, to
examine the structural condition of the units, i.e., floor, wall, and electrical wiring. Id app. B
at 6. The Decree explicitly forbade the CHA from inspecting personal property of the tenants
including bureaus, dresser drawers, closets, bed clothes, clothing, boxes, or other containers.
Id. app. B at 7.
In October 1992, the CHA motioned the district court to modify the Consent Decree to allo.
searches of apartments and personal effects for drugs and weapons as a means of combatting
crime. Amended Motion to Modify Consent Decree at 1, Summeries (No. 88 C 10566). Although
the procedural history is confusing, apparently the CHA went ahead and instituted its new
"sweeps" policy in the fall of 1992 without court approval. David E.B. Smith, Note, Ckan SwVp
or tch Hunt?: Constitutional Issues in Cicago's Public Housing Sueeps, 69 CHL-KE L REV. 505,
507 (1993) (explaining that in response to death ofseven-year-old boy in fall of 1992, "the CHA
reinstituted an even more aggressive sweep program" that resulted in further litigation). The
CHA later asked the court for authority to conduct the -arrantless searches, arguing that the
searches were outside the scope of the Consent Decree. Memorandum in Support of Request
forAuthority to Perform Warrantless Searches at 1-2, Summeries (No. 88 C 10566); s.ealsoSteven
Yarosh, Comment, Operation Clean Sweep. Is the Chicago HousingAulhoriiy 'Sw4ing'A ray theFourth
Amendment?, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1103, 1128-29 (1992) (arguing that searches authorized by
Consent Decree fit into special needs exception to warrant requirement and are therefore
constitutional).
7. Defendant Chicago Housing Authority's Answer to Class Action Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985) (describing purpose of CHA's
search policy as stopping violence, finding and removing weapons, and protecting people and
property). The searches occurred during the months ofJuly and August 1993. Ad. at 2.
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the CHA's police force8 searched entire apartment units, examining
closets, drawers, refrigerators, cabinets, and personal effects, without
probable cause to believe that any particular apartment contained
weapons.9
This policy sparked wide criticism because it gave broad authority
to CHA officials to search tenants' homes, which many argued
violated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution." Opponents
noted that the sweeps policy unacceptably put the need to make the
developments safer in conflict with the tenants' right to privacy under
the Fourth Amendment.1  In fact, although many of the tenants
actually supported the sweeps,12 four CHA tenants, represented by
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), responded to the policy
by filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, claiming that the warrantless searches, conducted
pursuant to the sweeps policy, violated their Fourth Amendment
rights. 3 The court agreed, and, on April 7, 1994, ordered a prelimi-
nary injunction to end the sweeps, holding that there was "a substan-
tial likelihood that the .. . [sweeps] violate[d] the Fourth Amend-
ment." 4 In its decision, the court acknowledged that the searches
had the support of many of the CHA tenants 5 and that the CHA
8. The Chicago Housing Authority Police have the "same powers as thoze conferred on
the police of organized cities and villages." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 310, para. 8.1a (Smith-Hurd
1993).
9. Prat 848 F. Supp. at 793 (detailing places searched within apartments and noting
disregard for normal warrant process).
10. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
11. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (providing examples of criticisms of sweeps
policy).
12. Prat4 848 F. Supp. at 796.
13. See id. at 793 (explaining that plaintiffs, who were "all tenants and lawful residents" of
CHA developments, complained that CHA had violated their rights under Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of Constitution). The complaint asked for declaratory and injunctive
relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. Id. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) had also represented the tenants in Summeries. Yarosh, supra note 6,
at 1104.
14. Prat 848 F. Supp. at 796. Specifically, the court held that the plaintiffs had a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, that there was no adequate remedy at law and
that they would be irreparably harmed if not for the injunction, that the balance of hardships
favored the plaintiffs, and that the public interest would not be harmed by granting the
injunction on the sweeps. IML; see also infra note 39 and accompanying text (delineating legal
standard for injunctive relief applied by court).
15. See Prat4 848 F. Supp. at 796 (acknowledging that tenants' "sad experience" of
inadequate law enforcement services in housing projects has "prepared [tenants] to forgo their
own constitutional rights" and rights of their neighbors in name of safety).
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had a valid need to maintain safety in the developments. 6 The
court warned, however, that although many Americans supported
warrantless searches in the inner city, "all Americans are bound
together in law and fact" and the erosion of rights in one part of the
city "undermine[s] the rights of each of us.
"17
In response to the preliminary injunction, and in an effort to
illustrate its concerns about the problem of crime in public low-
income housing developments, 8 the Clinton administration devised
policy guidelines (Clinton Guidelines or Guidelines) 9 aimed at
providing public housing officials with "effective and constitutionally
valid" law enforcement measures to use "in dealing with the severe
problems of violent crime in urban public housing developments.""0
In addition to providing other recommendations, the Clinton
Guidelines suggested that housing authority officials put "consent
clauses" into leases, presumably avoiding the sweeps' constitutional
problems by having the tenants explicitly consent to sweep-like
searches.2'
Although both the sweeps policy and the Clinton Guidelines are
sincere attempts to fight violence in the housing projects, the
methods each recommends to reduce crime and thereby make the
developments safer have important constitutional implications. In
particular, both beg the question of whether the government is
requiring the tenants who live in low-income housing to forgo their
16. See i&. (noting that CHA is responsible for maintaining"safe conditions in projects but
has inadequate resources to do so properly).
17. ltL at 797.
18. As a reaction to the district court decision, President Clinton "instructed Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros and Attorney GeneralJanet Reno to devise
a constitutional, effective way to protect the residents ofAmerica's public housing communities."
The President's Radio Address, 30 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. DO=. 823 (Apr. 16, 1994) [hereinafter
Radio Address]. Clinton stressed that "[e]very lau-abidingAmerican, rich or poor has the right
to raise children without the fear of criminals terrorizing where they llve." Md.; s4 eg., fitchell
Locin, C.inton Unveils a Sweeps Plan for CHA, CHI. TRiu., Apr. 17,1994, at 1 (stating that President
Clinton pursued aggressive use of sweeps to reduce violence in public housing projects);
O'Connor & Locin, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing President Clinton's response to district court's
injunction); Clarence Page, For CMA Rmsident a Flght to Ktep Their Con.utonaLighLts, CHL TM.,
Apr. 13,1994, at 21 (mentioning that President Clinton asked for guidelines as part of his "anti-
crime campaign"); Lynn Sweet, Fds at Odds over Swaps, CHL SUN-TMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at 3
(discussing differences in approaches between Justice Department and HUD in preparing
guidelines).
19. See Letter from Janet Reno and Henry Cisneros, Apr. 14, 1994 [hereinafter Reno
Letter], reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. S4660 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (outlining Clinton
Guidelines).
20. Id.
21. Id. (explaining that warrantless searches are constitutional as long as conducted
pursuant to "uncoerced consent"); see infra Part LB and accompanying notes (outlining specific
recommendations setforth in Guidelines); infraPartMLB.1 and accompanying notes (articulating
consent exception to warrant requirement of Fourth Amendment).
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right to privacy, protected by the Fourth Amendment, as a means of
achieving safety in the developments. This Comment focuses on the
constitutional issues raised by the sweeps policy and the Guidelines,
examining how the sweeps policy and the Clinton Guidelines affect
the tenants' rights under the Fourth Amendment and whether the
goal of safetyjustifies the privacy intrusion these two policies promote.
Part I gives a detailed description of the sweeps policy, the searches
conducted pursuant to this policy, and the reasons why the district
court decided to enjoin the CHA from pursuing the policy. In
addition, Part I describes the Clinton Guidelines and the questions
raised by its recommendations. Part II outlines the relevant Fourth
Amendmentjurisprudence regarding warrantless searches conducted
in homes. Part III provides an analysis of the constitutionality of the
sweeps policy, concluding that the policy ofwarrantless sweep searches
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of public housing tenants. Part
III also discusses the Clinton Guidelines in terms of Fourth Amend-
mentjurisprudence, determining that, as written, the Guidelines will
lead housing authorities to institute search policies that violate their
tenants' Fourth Amendment rights. Part IV provides specific recom-
mendations as to how the Clinton administration should revise the
Guidelines to avoid the constitutional problems posed by the
Guidelines while still providing guidance to housing authorities as to
how to make the developments safer for the tenants. This Comment
concludes by pointing out the dangers of allowing the erosion of
constitutional rights in the name of safety.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Sweeps Policy
The CHA characterized the sweeps as a law enforcement effort
instituted "for the common good of the tenants (of the CHA
developments], [and] for the safety of the general population."22
22. Response Memorandum of the Chicago HousingAuthority at 2, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985).
In the words of the CHA, the policy may be summarized as:
Where there is persistent and continuous gunfire or other weapons related incidents
on CHA property, and given that CHA can identify a building or buildings from which
such incidents take place but not specific locations within such buildings, searches
involving an entire building(s) in which the weapon may be stored or from which the
gunfire or incident originated are necessary. Such searches are necessary for law
enforcement purposes, for the common good of the tenants, for the safety of the
general population, and for the ability to effectively manage the CHA developments,
These searches include searches of individual apartments and personal effects.
Id. at 1-2.
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The policy authorized the CHA police force to conduct searches of
entire buildings, including individual apartments, whenever "persistent
and continuous gunfire or other weapons related incidents" occur on
the premises. Pursuant to the policy, CHA police could search all
apartments in a particular building if they were unable to identify the
specific location from which the gunfire originated, in an effort to
locate the weapons being used.24 Furthermore, the policy autho-
rized the CHA police to look through personal effects, which
included searches of cabinets and dresser drawers, refrigerators, under
mattresses, and inspections of private papers.2"
In applying the policy during the summer of 1993, the CHA police
conducted warrantless searches of twelve apartment developments,
constituting more than 1000 total units.' Although most of the
tenants who were at home at the time of the sweeps consented to the
searches in writing,2 8 the CHA also searched the homes of tenants
who were not at home and who had not previously consented to the
search.2
The CHA intended that the sweeps be conducted in response to
the exigency of gunfire, however, none of the building-wide searches
occurred sooner than forty-eight hours after a gun-related incident'
23. I& at 2; see also Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793 (explaining that sweeps policy authorized
searches when certain preconditions including "random gunfire from building to building,"
"intimidation at gunpoint," and shooting inside buildings occurred). For example, the mostwell
known incident that triggered a sweep occurred at the Robert Taylor Homes after sniper fire
directed at contractors employed to install protective v,window (to alleviate the problem of
children falling out of windows) in the development injured a CHA security guard and caused
the contractor to walk off the job. Memorandum in Support of Request for Authority to
Perform Warrantless Searches at 2-3, PraU (No. 93 C 6935). Another incident that attracted
much attention was the shooting death at Cabrini Green housing project of a seven-year-old boy.
See Smith, supra note 6, at 507 (relating how boy's death "shocked the city").
24. See Response Memorandum of the Chicago Housing Authority at 2, Pratt (No. 93 C
6985).
25. Id.
26. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 794 (listing areas searched during sweep); see aso Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 1, Praft
(No. 93 C 6985) (describing search of Plaintiff Redman's house as turning her "home upside
down").
27. See Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793 (noting that CHA ordered searches of 12 residential
buildings on four different occasions beginning in summer of 1993); Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2, Prat (No. 93 C
6985) (explaining that each development has at least 160 separate units and that in total over
1000 apartments were searched).
28. Defendant Chicago Housing Authoritys Answer to Cm Action Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985).
29. See Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793-94 (noting that CHA conceded failure to obtain consent
from absent tenants).
30. Id. at 793 (observing that it took CHA several da)s to institute searches in response to
emergency situations).
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The CHA blamed its slow reaction on the "logistical difficulties of
coordinating sufficient police to search properly."31
The ACLU represented the four tenants who sued the CHA. It
filed suit on behalf of the tenants as a class,32 asking the court to
enjoin the CHA from continuing to conduct searches pursuant to the
sweeps policy.33 Plaintiffs alleged that the warrantless searches
conducted by the CHA violated the tenants' rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The CHA responded to the suit by
arguing that the searches were "emergency inspections for weapons"
and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.' First, the CHA argued
that the majority of tenants consented to the searches.5 Second, the
government interest in maintaining order and safety in the develop-
ments, it contended, outweighed the tenants' privacy expectations,
thus justifying warrantless searches.3" Finally, the CHA explained
that exigent circumstances created by the gunfire required and
allowed the police to conduct warrantless searches.
3 7
The district court, however, found the CHA's arguments unpersua-
sive.' In its opinion, the court did not determine whether the CHA
had actually violated the constitutional rights of the tenants. Instead,
it held that the tenants' claims were sufficient to just injunctive
relief.3" The court found that the tenants' claim had "a reasonable
31. IiL
32. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48 (explaining that court later decertified class
action at request of tenant leaders but that decertification had no effect on validity of
injunction).
33. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting that Plaintiff Pratt's complaint asked
for injunctive relief, arguing that CHA's warrantless searches violated Plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment ights).
34. Response Memorandum of the Chicago HousingAuthority at 4, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985)
(arguing that plaintiffs cannot succeed on merits because CHA's searches meet Fourth
Amendment requirements allowing searches without warrants).
35. See id. at 4-5 (maintaining that CHA had authority to conduct sweeps because during
each of 10 searches all but one tenant "present at the time of the inspection" consented to
search and clause in lease allowed CHA to enter apartments when emergencies exist).
36. See id. at 5-10 (outlining special needs exception to Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement and arguing that because of severe problem of violence in developments, sweeps
policy fits within exception).
37. See id. at 10-13 (defining exigency exception to warrant requirement and concluding
that weapons problem in development created sufficient exigency to justify searches).
38. See Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 797 (enjoining CHA from conducting further warrantlesw
searches pursuant to sweeps policy).
39. Id. (explaining that harm caused by violating constitutional rights through varantless
searches outweighs safety benefits derived by conducting searches). Specifically, the court held
that plaintiffs had proven their legal elements, namely that:
(1) the plaintiffs [had] at least a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
plaintiffs [had] no adequate remedy at law and [would] be irreparably injured if the
defendants [were] not enjoined; (3) the balance of hardships favor~ed] granting the
preliminary injunction; and (4) the public interest [would] not be disserved if the
injunction [was] granted.
1910
1995] SEARCH FOR SAFETY 1911
likelihood of success."' The court emphasized that exigent circum-
stances did not exist at the time the searches were conducted, citing
the fact that the searches occurred several days after the gunfire.4'
In addition, the court found that the CHA did not have probable
cause to search the apartments, noting that even if exigent circum-
stances had existed, the CHA still needed to show that a particular
apartment contained weapons in order to conduct a legal warrantless
search of that apartnent.'
Moreover, the court found that the likelihood that the searches
would violate the constitutional rights of CHA residents outweighed
any added safety benefit that the searches might provide.' The
court also stressed that the searches were an "ineffective means to
secure long-term safety" and that they were "a chaotic invasion of
privacy" that did not, in the long term, reduce illegal activity. The
court acknowledged that many CHA tenants supported the sweep
searches, but noted that such support did not justify the erosion of
the constitutional rights of the supporters' neighbors.
Reaction to the sweeps policy and the court's decision has been
mixed. Many CHA tenants were upset with the decision, and, in fact,
eighteen tenant leaders filed a motion to de-certify the original class
action suit' on behalf of the tenants who supported the sweeps
policy.47 Although the court granted this motion, noting that the
"class representatives" that brought the case against CHA could not
"be deemed to fairly and adequately protect the interests" of the
tenants who supported the policy, this decision had no effect on the
Id. at 794.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 795-96.
42. I& (arguing that because CHA searched apartments even when there ws no reason to
believe that residents participated in crime, CHA's search policy failed Fourth Amendment
requirement of probable cause). In its decision, the court did not address the CHA's arguments
that the searches conducted with the consent of the tenants were constitutional. Similarly, the
court did not mention the special government needs exception and why it did not apply to the
CHA searches. For an analysis of the policy in terms of consent and special needs, see infra Part
43. Pratt 848 F. Supp. at 796.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 796-97 (pointing out that eroding constitutional rights for some individuals would
equally erode those rights for all individuals).
46. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 155 F.RLD. 177, 178 (NJ). IMI 1994). Each CHA
development has a Local Advisory Council (LAC) made up of residents of the developments.
Id. The plaintiffi in this case represented 18 of the 19 LAC presidents. Id. These same
representatives were defendant-intervenors in Pratt contending that the sweeps policy did not
violate their Fourth Amendment rights. Pratt 848 F. Supp. at 793.
47. See rat, 155 F.LD. at 178 (purporting that 5000 CHA residents signed petition
expressing support of sweeps policy and opposing action by ACLU).
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validity of the injunction.48  Many scholars and journalists, however,
praised the decision of the court to enjoin the sweeps, writing that the
policy severely threatened the civil liberties of the tenants and that the
CHA should find less intrusive and more effective means of maling
the developments safe.49
B. The Clinton Guidelines
President Clinton responded to the district court's decision by
asking Attorney General Janet Reno and Housing and Urban
Development Secretary Henry Cisneros to develop guidelines for
housing authorities throughout the country that would recommend
constitutionally acceptable ways to conduct searches for guns in low-
income housing developments.50 On April 14, 1994, President
Clinton announced the content of the Guidelines.1 Among other
suggestions,52 the Clinton Guidelines recommended that housing
48. Id. at 179 (stating that although class was decertified, original injunction nevertheless
prevents warrantless searches absent consent).
49. See, eg., Don't Trash Constitution in Zeal to Fight Crime, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 1994, at 8A
(suggesting that instead of sweeps, CHA should provide more effective police protection);
Vernonjarret, Ignoring4th Amendment Is a Dangerous Prdent, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at
29 (emphasizing that need for strong Bill of Rights makes policy suspect and that crisis situation
does not justify eroding civil liberties);John Leo, Sweeping up the Projects, U.S. NaVws & WO=.
REP., May 2, 1994, at 20 (indicating that policy was "cheap and dramatic alternative" but
ineffective and unconstitutional solution to safety problems); Page, supra note 18, at 21 (arguing
that privacy rights and safety rights should not be mutually exclusive); Projects and Police Raids,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 19, 1994, at A14 (suggesting that more effective means, such as increased
security within development, should be instituted rather than sweep searches); Richard Roeper,
Issue of Rights Makes Sweeps Stakes Too High, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 12, 1994, at 11 (noting that
policy set "a very dangerous precedent"); Terry, supra note 4, at A12 (reporting that even
attorney who represented tenants who supported search believed that sweeps were ineffective
"'glitzy, superficial quick fixes'" to housing development problems); Eric Zorn, A Bill of Rights
Worth Defending, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 1994, at 1 (discussing that sweeps policy erodes rights
guaranteed by Bill of Rights). But see Gary L. Bauer, Protect Poor From Crime, USA TODAY, Apr,
13, 1994, at 8A (stating that sweeps decision was misguided and that "liberal federal judges are
making" the Bill of Rights "a suicide pact" for Americans who are "terrorize d in their]
communit[ies]").
50. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing President Clinton's belief that
sweeps policy was needed to combat violence in low-income housing developments).
51. SeeRadio Address, supra note 18, at 822-24 (announcing new policy to "encourage more
weapons frisks of suspicious person[s], and... [to have] tenant associations... put clauses in
their leases allowing searches when crime conditions make it necessary").
52. The Guidelines outlined seven "options... which,., are constitutionally valid, at least
in the extraordinary circumstances presented by the crime problem in the Robert Taylor
Homes." Reno Letter, supra note 19. The Guidelines provide in relevant part that:
2. Consent Searche A search is lawful if it is conducted pursuant to an uncoerced
consent. Leases in housing projects, as elsewhere, typically include a standard consent
clause permitting ... routine maintenance inspections and to enter ... in case of
emergency. Where crime conditions in the housing development make unit-by-unit
inspections essential, similar lease consent clauses could be employed to authorize
periodic administrative inspections of tenants' units for unlicensed or unauthorized
firearms.
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authorities place standard consent clauses into their leases that would
permit housing authority officials to search each apartment for
unlicensed and unauthorized gunsOs The Guidelines described
these searches as "periodic administrative inspections" and likened the
consent clause to the standard clauses already included in leases
allowing the housing authority to conduct emergency maintenance
inspections.'
The Guidelines also suggested three ways of reducing "any
constitutional objection to the inspection[s]."11 First, they recom-
mended that the searches occur on a regular basis, during daytime,
and that they be "no more intrusive than absolutely necessary to
determine whether weapons are present" in the apartment.'
Second, they advised housing authorities to give the tenants advance
notice of inspections and of the general time frame within which they
would take place. 7 Finally, the Guidelines indicated that "tenant
associations . . . be encouraged to endorse . . . the inclusion of
consent clauses in lease agreements" by enacting resolutions to that
effect 8
As in the case of maintenance inspections, such firearms inspections should be
conducted on a routine basis, during daylight hours, and should be no more intruive
than absolutely necessary to determine whether weapons are present in the tenant's
unit.
If the agency gives advance notice ... that an inspection will be conducted and the
general period within which it will take place the intrusiveness of the inspection will
be lessened and any constitutional objection to the inspection thereby reduced ....
5. Warrant Sehes on Probable Causv Whenever law enforcement officials have
probable cause to believe that a specific dwelling contains evidence of a crime, a search
may be conducted with ajudicial warrant ....
6. Searches Based on Exigent Circurstanem. Housing authority officials may conduct
warrantess searches of individual units where there is justification for a search but
insufficient time to obtain ajudicial warrant.
Id.
Other provisions included placing metal detectors in entrances, erecting fences around
developments, using identification cards, searching common areas and vacant apartments, and
conducting weapons frisks of suspicious persons. Id.
53. Reno Letter, supra note 19 (stating that because leases usually include consent clauses
allowing housing authorities to enter apartments for maintenance purposes, similar consent
clause could be used to allow inspections for firearms).
54. Reno Letter, supra note 19; sa Response Memorandum of the Chicago Housing
Authority at 5, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985) (describing consent clause currently incorporated in CHA
leases allowing apartment entry when CHA officials reasonably believe emergency exists);
Consent Decree app. B at 1-9, Summries (No. 88 C 10566) (spelling out guidelines for
emergency inspections of development apartments pursuant to legal agreement between CHA
and tenants).
55. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
56. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
57. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
58. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
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The Guidelines do not clearly indicate whether housing authorities
should require that a tenant sign the lease consent clause in order to
obtain or remain in publicly funded housing. The Guidelines merely
indicate that "[w] here crime conditions in the housing developments
make unit-by-unit inspections essential," such clauses "could be
employed."59 The Guidelines do suggest, however, that the housing
authorities have discretion to decide how to present the consent
clause to their tenants.'"
Another relevant provision in the Guidelines suggests that housing
authorities conduct searches supported by a warrant when the police
have probable cause to believe that the apartment contains evidence
of a crime.6 In addition, the Guidelines recommend that housing
authorities may conduct warrantless searches "where there is a
justification for a search, but insufficient time to obtain a judicial
warrant." 2 In other words, the searches may take place when
"exigent circumstances" are present.
Press and scholarly reaction to the Clinton Guidelines has centered
on whether it is constitutional to ask tenants to consent to sweep
searches in their leases. The Clinton administration argued that
"[e]very law-abiding American, rich or poor, has the right to raise
children without the fear of criminals terrorizing where they live," and
that the Guidelines help to ensure that the tenants realize they
possess a right to safety.63 In essence, the Administration's argument
seems to be that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreason-
able searches can often be an impediment to ensuring safety in the
59. Reno Letter, supra note 19 (emphasis added).
60. On April 21, 1994, Senator Dole offered an amendment to S. 540, the Bankruptcy
Amendment Act, stating that the Senate had endorsed the Clinton Guidelines. 140 CONG. REC.
S4657 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994). Senator Wellstone promptly introduced his own amendment
to Senator Dole's amendment. Senator Wellstone's amendment stated that consent clauses,
allowing searches for guns in housing authority leases, could not be a requirement for residency.
Id at S4658-59. The amendment further stated that residents and potential residents must be
informed that acceptance of a consent clause in their lease is not a requirement for residency.
Id The Senate endorsed the Dole amendment, only after it was modified, so that access to
public housing would not be conditioned on signing of the lease. Id. at S4663. The
compromise language that the Senate agreed upon was: "include noncoercive consent clauses
in lease agreements permitting routine warrantless apartment-by-apartment police searches for
illegal weapons and illegal drugs, so long as residency or continued residency in public housing
is not contingent upon the inclusion of such consent clause as a provision of a lease." d.
61. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
62. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
63. Radio Address, supra note 18, at 823; see also Marsha Ginsburg, Clinton's Tough Plan on
Guns in Projects; Residents of S.F. Housing Skeptical About Searches, SAN FRANciSCO EXAMINER, Apr,
17, 1994, at Al (observing that although tenants want to be safe, Guidelines were received with
skepticism in San Francisco because of other problems they create); Gwen ill, Clinton Asks Help
on Police Sweeps in Public Housing, N.Y. TIES, Apr. 17,1994, atAl (describing President Clinton's
emphasis on safety in public housing).
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housing projects.' The argument also stresses that the right to
safety is so fundamental, and the support for the searches so strong,
that these factors outweigh concerns over the constitutionality of
consent searches via public housing leases.'s Critics, however, point
out that such clauses coerce public housing tenants into relinquishing
their Fourth Amendment rights.66 Occupants of the projects are
often unable to afford any other type of housing. Therefore, they are
not given a viable alternative if they do not support the searches.
Furthermore, the critics argue that the recommendations outlined in
the Guidelines, like the sweeps policy, force the tenants to forgo their
right to privacy in order to receive the benefit of safety.67 Critics
point out that the Clinton administration should concentrate instead
on recommending less intrusive ways to deal with the problem of
violence endemic to the projects,' noting that safety should not
64. SeePage, supra note 18, at 21 (commenting that Clinton Guidelines treat constitutional
protections as impediment to "effective crime-fighting"). The Guidelines, themselves, indicate
that the options they present are constitutional because of the "extraordinary circumstances" of
violence in the developments. Reno Letter, supra note 19. Such language suggests that because
the circumstances in the developments are so urgent, the tenants' expectation of privacy
becomes less important than their need for protection.
65. See 140 CONG. REc. S4665 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994) (statement by Sen. Biden)
(discussing constitutional arguments in favor of Clinton policy).
66. See iU (statement by Sen. Biden) (explaining that opponents of consent clause argue
that it unfairly asks poor people to give up fundamental rights); see aLioJan Crawford, CHA
Sweeps Poliy Near Passing Test CH. Tam., Apr. 19, 1994, at N1 (reporting that constitutional
experts predict that Supreme Court is unlikely to find that consent clause vould pass
constitutional muster); Ginsburg, supra note 63, at Al (reporting that San Francisco housing
authority official conceded that tenants might feel pressured to sign consent clause "to gain
access to public housing"); Iffil, supra note 63, at Al (explaining that some public housing
experts believe that tenants will feel compelled to agree to sign consent clause to ensure
eligibility for public housing); Page, supra note 18, at 21 (arguing that poor should not be
required to trade constitutional rights for safety); Pfrtfs and Police Rai, supra note 49, at A14
(arguing that public housing eligibility should not be contingent on signing consent clause, and
that even if 99% of tenants support searches, housing authority cannot compel neighbors to be
searched).
67. Sre Guns Sweeps: No Modelfor C'ties N.Y. TMIES, Apr. 20, 1994, at A18 (suggesting that
Guidelines draw "a false distinction between tenants' constitutional rights" and right of safety);
see alsoJarret, supra note 49, at 29 (warning that Clinton Guidelines set dangerous precedent by
which police power may be utilized whenever "crisis" evolves); Page, supra note 18, at 21
(condemning notion that public housing tenants must"trade-off" privacy for protection); Safry -
for-Rights a Bad Trade CH. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1994, at N22 (calling "trade-off" between living in
safety and waiving Fourth Amendment rights "unsavory").
68. See Harvey Grossman, Toward Inarased SeuryforPublicHousingRiden1 CH. DAILYL.
BULL, Apr. 23, 1994, at 22 (noting that summer 1993 searches were ineffective and arguing that
government should provide "professional, vell-trained law enforcement officers in sufficient
numbers"); Ray Hartmann, Amerka's Latest Crime Vlctim, RiV OEtRROW TzIS, Apr. 20-26,1994, at
2 (noting that "real answer" to safety problems in public housing is to assign more police to
projects and to have police constantly survey); Leo, supra note 49, at 20 (maintaining that
housing developments need "real police []not easily intimidated rent-a-copsD)" to ensure safety);
Safey-for-RightsA Bad Trade, supra note 67, at N22 (suggesting"old fashion police patroW rather
than sweep searches).
1916 THE AMERICAN UNIVERsITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1903
come at the cost of the erosion of the right to privacy protected by
the Fourth Amendment.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
CONCERNING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF THE HOME
A. Warrantless Searches of Homes Are Presumptively Unconstitutional
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from warrantless and
unreasonable searches of their homes. 9 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect the privacy and security of individuals against "arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials."70 Although, on its face, the
Amendment protects the privacy of individuals "in their persons...
papers, and effects,"71 the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
individual's privacy interest is greatest in the home.72 Accordingly,
69. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV; se4 eg., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,327 (1987) (emphasiz-
ing that warrantless searches and seizure in home are presumptively unreasonable); New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (noting that expectation of privacy in commercial setting
is less than in home); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (pointing out that "tilt Is
axiomatic" that Fourth Amendment's main purpose is to protect against physical entry of home);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (explaining that Fourth Amendment "prohibits
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home"); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (emphasizing that Fourth Amendment protects
individuals from arbitrary searches by government);Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948) (declaring thatwithoutwarrant requirement, Fourth Amendmentwould be "a nullity and
leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers"); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (acknowledging that framers intended Fourth Amendment to
"enact[] into the fundamental law... that a man's house was his castle").
70. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment wrote it as a reaction
to the writs of assistance, which authorized the colonial government to issue general warrants
upon which the government relied to conduct unreasonable searches of the home and to invade
the privacy of the citizenry. Weeks% 232 U.S. at 390. Therefore, the purpose of the Amendment
was to prevent the government from both conducting unreasonable searches and from issuing
general warrants. Id. The Amendment contains two clauses. The first clause prohibits
unreasonable searches. The second states that a warrant should not be issued without probable
cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 584-85 (explaining relevance of Fourth
Amendment clauses). Unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, courts read these
clauses together, finding that reasonable searches are those conducted pursuant to a valid
warrant. Se, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
(explaining that in most cases reasonable search is defined by existence of warrant); United
States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (noting that warrantless searches are illegal even if
probable cause exists); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 ("When the right of privacy must reasonably yield
to the right of search is... to be decided by ajudicial officer... ."). Thus, searches performed
without a warrant are presumptively unconstitutional. Id.; see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 588 n,26
(arguing that if court allows government agents to conduct warrantless searches, Fourth
Amendment would be meaningless). But see infra notes 76-143 and accompanying text
(discussing exceptions to Fourth Amendment warrant requirements).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90 (noting that "zone of privacy (is nowhere] more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimension of an individual's
home"); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (explaining that
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one of the basic rules of Fourth Amendment law is that a warrantless
search of an individual's home is presumptively unreasonable73
Under this rule, such searches are reasonable only if they are made
pursuant to a valid warrant 4 issued upon probable cause. The Court
has explained that a government official has probable cause to
conduct a search when the facts and reliable information are
sufficient to allow a reasonable person to believe that the item sought
sill be found in the place to be searched. 5
B. Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement
The Court has carved out "a few specifically established" exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 6 For purposes of
this Comment, four of these exceptions are particularly salient. First,
the government may obtain voluntary and noncoercive consent from
individuals to search their homes. 7  Second, in the face of exigent
circumstances, such as "hot pursuit," or when delay would endanger
police officers or the public, the government may search a home
.physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed"); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971) (calling privacy interest
protected by Fourth Amendment "most precious aspectlJ of personal security in the home");
see also supra note 69 (discussing application of Fourth Amendment to searches of homes).
73. Patom 445 US. at 586; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US. 443,454-55 (1971)
(holding that warrantless searches or seizures of home are "per se unreasonable").
74. According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of a warrant is to advise the individual
that "the search is authorized by law," that its scope has been limited, and that a neutral
magistrate, and not the police, has authorized the search. National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989).
75. Sew NewJersey v. T.LO., 469 US. 325, 363-64 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting in part)
(defining probable cause as when "'the facts and circumstances vuithin (the magistrate's]
knowledge and of which he had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a criminal offense had
occurred" (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132, 162 (1925))); =e alo Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (ad ncing definition of probable cause as "more
than bare suspicion" and declaring that it exists only where officers have knowledge and
.reasonably trustworthy information" that would lead reasonable person to believe "an offense
has been or is being committed"); WAmE . I.AFAVE &JEROLD H. LRAEL, CRMIlNAL PROCEDURE
138 (2d ed. 1992) (describing probable cause forsearches as requiring two conclusions: (1) that
items are seizable because they were used in context of criminal actiity, and (2) that police will
find items in place to be searched); CHARLES H. WHrrREAD & CHPRSTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALTSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 14647 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining
that literal meaning of probable cause requires showing that evidence sought more likely than
not will be found in place to be searched but that Supreme Court has indicated that it is a
flexible standard). The definition of probable cause to arrest a suspect differs from the
definition of probable cause for search and seizures. Id. at 147. A showing of probable cause
for arrest may not be sufficient to justify a search because a magistrate takes different factors
into consideration when issuing a search warrant. e.g., the scope of the search, than vhen
issuing an arrest warrant. I.
76. Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347, 357 (1967).
77. See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary consent exception to
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
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without a warrant.7" Third, government officials may perform
"administrative" inspections of homes with only a general warrant
based on a less stringent probable cause standard and may conduct
warrantless inspections of "pervasively regulated industries."
79
Fourth, where special government interests are so greatly threatened
that they outweigh the individual's privacy expectation, government
officials may reasonably conduct warrantless searches.
8 0
1. Consent
A government official may perform a warrantless search of a
dwelling if that official receives valid consent from the occupant.81
To decide whether the individual has consented in the context of the
Fourth Amendment, courts will look to whether the "totality of the
circumstances" indicates that consent was voluntary.82 The Supreme
Court has held that coercion, "no matter how subtly" applied, will
invalidate consent.83 In determining whether consent to a search is
the product of coercion, courts ask whether the police obtained
consent by using threats or force,84 or whether they used more
"subtle forms of coercion that might flaw... [the defendant's] judg-
ment."85 Courts base the ultimate determination on various factors
such as how the police asked for consent,86 the characteristics of the
78. See infra notes 96-111 and accompanying text (outlining exigent circumstances exception
to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
79. See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text (explaining how less stringent probable
cause requirement is required for some administrative searches while no warrant requirement
exists for other administrative searches).
80. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text (delineating special needs exception to
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
81. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (holding that where there Is
valid consent, no search warrant is required); Bumper v. North Carolina, 891 U.S. 543, 548-49
(1968) (explaining that consent is invalid when individual allows search after police falsely claim
to possess search warrant); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946) (finding that
search and seizure of gasoline ration coupons vras reasonable because search was pursuant to
valid consent); WHrrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 75, at 231 (explaining that consent
constitutes waiver of expectation of privacy as to place to be searched).
82. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227. In Bustamonte, the Supreme Court held that the standard
of examining the "totality of all the circumstances," which California courts used to determine
the validity of confessions under the due process clause, applied to the Fourth Amendment as
a means of determining "whether a consent to search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product
of duress or coercion." I&
83. IL at 228.
84. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1980) (finding that In
determining whether police coerced defendant, itwas relevant that when police asked defendant
to accompany them to questioning room, no threats or force were used to persuade her to go);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) (noting that absence of threats or physical
force was significant in determining whether defendant voluntarily consented).
85. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424.
86. Se, eg., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (holding
that officers could not break down door without warrant); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.
1918
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person consenting,87 whether the consenter had knowledge of the
constitutionally protected right not to be searchedp and where the
request for consent occurred8 9
In light of the emphasis on the requirement that consent searches
must be voluntary, it logically follows that when an individual
withdraws consent to a search, any subsequent search is not voluntary.
To hold otherwise would make the requirement that consent be
voluntary meaningless. The Supreme Court, however, has only
considered this issue indirectly.
90
In Rorida v.fimeno,91 considering the constitutionality of a warrant-
less search of an automobile, the Court indicated that a suspect has
the power to "delimit" the scope of a consent search.' Accordingly,
if a suspect withdraws consent completely, the officer no longer has
the authority to conduct a consent search of any scope. This logic
has been accepted by many lower courts, which have held that
individuals "may limit or withdraw... consent to search" and that in
such cases the government actor must abide by the individual's
decision.9" Moreover, scholars have also endorsed the idea that
543, 549 (1968) (finding that when police asserted existence of search warrant, "acquiescence
to [such] a claim of lawful authority" was not valid consent); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313,315-17(1921) (holding thatwhere government officers demand admission withoutwarrant
situation implied presence of coercion).
87. See Mendenuzil, 446 U.S. at 558 (noting that relevant, but not disposiuive, factors in
determining whether consent was given include sex, race, and education of defendant);
Buslamonte, 412 U.S. at 248 (noting that "minimal schooling, [and] low intelligence are factors
to consider" in determining whether consent was coerced).
88. See Bustamort 412 U.S. at 227 (indicating that "(k]norledge of the right to refuse
consent is one factor to be taken into account" in determining whether consentas voluntary);
see also Mendjail 446 U.S. at 559 (explaining fact that police told defendant that she had right
to refuse search "substantially lessened the probability that ... [the police's] conduct could
reasonably have appeared ... to be coercive"). In Bustamone the Court distinguished
"'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights" as required under the Fifth Amendment from
Fourth Amendment consent searches. Bustamon1 412 U.S. at 241. The Court held that.
although knowledge of the right not to be searched may be considered as a factor in
determining whether consent was voluntarily given, "the government need not establish such
knowledge as the sine quo non of an effective consent." Id. at 227.
89. See MendenaIl 446 U.S. at 555 (noting significance of fact that initial request to see
identification occurred "in the public concourse" of airport); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 424 (1976) (emphasizing that police requested consent to search defendant's car while on
public street, not in police station).
90. Cf. VHrrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 75, at 241 (discussing limitations on consent
not directly discussed by Supreme Court).
91. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
92. Florida v.Ji-neno, 500 U.S. 248,252 (1991).
93. United States v. Dyer, 784 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1986); see ato United States v.
Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1994) (indicating that court should consider whether
individual failed "to object to the continuation of a vehicle search after giving general consent"
to determine scope of consent); United States v. Dorsey, 27 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1994)
(emphasizing importance of fact that defendant did not revoke consent to determine validity
of warrantless search of business destroyed by fire); United States v. Gleason, 25 F.Sd 605, 603
(8th Cir.) (finding warrantless search of car constitutional because defendant did not vithdraw
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consent to searches may be withdrawn or limited "at any time prior
to the completion of the search."' Scholars base this theory on
Supreme Court decisions in the context of the Fifth Amendment,
which have held that voluntary consent may be withdrawn at any time
during a police interrogation."
2. Exigent circumstances
The Supreme Court has held that under certain circumstances
when police have an immediate need to act, the exigency of the
situation may justify a warrantless search. 6 For example, the Court
has indicated that police do not need to obtain a warrant when they
are in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing criminal,97 when they need to
prevent a suspect's escape,9" and when waiting to search would
create danger to police officers or others inside or outside a dwell-
previously given consent), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 283 (1994); United States v.Jachimko, 19 F.3d
296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that "'traditional' consent doctrine" holds that in analyzing
validity of search, court may determine whether individual withdrew consent); United States v.
McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir.) (explaining that once individual withdraws consent,
search "must be measured against [other] Fourth Amendment principles"), cert denied, 114 S.
Ct. 393 (1993). The court in Dyernoted, however, that if the consenter withdraws consent after
discovery of evidence, "consent remains valid" and therefore the search is constitutional. Dyer,
784 F.2d at 816; see alsoJachimko, 19 F.3d at 299 (finding that if discovery of illegal substances
occurred prior to withdrawal of consent, search would be valid).
94. See WHIrEBRE&D & SLOnOGIN, supra note 75, at 241-42 (explaining that Reporters of
American Law Institute's MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 240.3(3) (1975) were
convinced by argument that"reasoning of those decisions which permit a withdrawal of a waiver
to police questioning" should be extended to allow withdrawal of consent in consent searches).
95. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 75, at 24142; see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
100 (1975) (explaining that during police questioning, if individual indicates his desire not to
answer questions, interrogation must cease); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1966)
("If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."). In addition, in Buslamonte, the Supreme
Court borrowed the standard for voluntary confessions and applied this standard to the Fourth
Amendment. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229. The Court reasoned that the prohibition against
coercion being used to obtain a confession also applies to officials seeking consent to search,
Id.
96. See, eg., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (declining to find exigent
circumstances where "there was no immediate or continuous pursuit" of suspect); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (noting that exigency exists where there is emergency or
dangerous situation); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967) (emphasizing that "[s] peed
... was essential" in determining whether search of home vras constitutional under exigent
circumstances exception to warrant). The dictionary definition of exigent circumstances Is
"[s] ituations that demand unusual or immediate action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 574 (6th ed,
1990).
97. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); see Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298 (findIng
warrantless search proper where police were told that suspected armed robber entered home
five minutes earlier); see also Wesh, 466 U.S. at 753 (acknowledging that hot pursuit allows valid
warrantless searches).
98. Olson, 495 U.S. at 100; see also Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299 (finding that need of police to
find armed suspect created exigent circumstances).
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ing.9 In these situations, speed is an essential component of the
police action and obtaining a warrant may unreasonably impede that
action.tu This exception to the warrant requirement, however, is
said to be very "strictly circumscribed" by the facts of the particular
case.
10t
Even when such an exigency is found to exist, it is not necessarily
enough to justify a warrantless search of a home. Courts have
indicated that even when exigent circumstances exist, police must also
have probable cause to conduct the search in a home. -2  That is,
police must still have reason to believe that the item they are looking
for will be found in the place they plan to search." 3 Although the
Supreme Court has not directly considered this issue, it held in
Arizona v. Hicks that probable cause is required for vrarrantless
"dwelling-place search[es]" regardless of whether the item vras in
"plain view."" 4 The Court emphasized that finding warrantless
searches of homes reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is not
the same as dispensing with the probable cause requirement."
99. Olson, 495 U.S. at 100; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385. 392-93 (1978)
(recognizing that where emergency situations create need to protect lives, warrantless exigency
searches may be acceptable); Haden, 387 U.S. at 298-99 (noting that Fourth Amendment does
not require police to delay searching home if delay "would gravely endanger their lives or the
lives of others").
100. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (declining to apply exigency exception where suspected drunk
driver was arrested in privacy of his own bedroom because "there a no immediate... pursuit
from the scene of a crime" and no threat to public safety); Payton, 445 U.S. at 583 (explaining
that in cases where there is ample time to obtain a warrant," exigent circumstances are not
present); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393 (finding that four-day search could not be justified as exigency
search); Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 794 (N.D. IlL 1994) (defining 'exigent
circumstances" as those involving "extreme immediate urgency").
101. Mine,, 437 U.S. at 393 (quotingTerryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)); e alo Olson,
495 U.S. at 100 (finding no exigent circumstances despite fact that police identified house in
which suspected robber was hiding, had information that he ,as present in house, and had been
warned that robber planned to leave town); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987)
(finding that although exigent circumstances existed to search apartment for weapons,
circumstances did notjustify search of serial numbers on stereo).
102. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 773 (1969) (VhiteJ., dissenting) (explaining
that warrantless search of home may be reasonable if "there are exigent circumstances, and
probable cause"); United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569,1574 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting 'bright-
line rule" that probable cause is necessary for searches of homes); United States v. Scott, 520
F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that "exigencies... cannot... excuse lack of probable
cause" in performing searches of apartment), cert. deniA 423 U.S. 1056 (1976); WHrrEBREAD &
SLOBOGIN, supra note 75, at 190 ("[A] warrantless entry is neverpermitted on less than probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed .... This is a fundamental Fourth Amendment
tenet.").
103. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (defining probable cause).
104. Hick. 480 U.S. at 328 (holding that "there is no reason in theory or practicality why
application of the 'plain view' doctrine would supplant" probable cause requirementforsearches
of homes).
105. IM. at 327. In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that "[d]ispensing with the need for a
warrant is worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for seizure [in a home] than
a warrant would require, i.e., the standard of probable cause." Id.
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Although the Court in Hicks discussed another exception to the
warrantless search rule-plain view searches-the statement seems
equally applicable to exigent circumstances. Both exigency and plain
view are exceptions to the warrant requirement brought about by
circumstances that make a warrant impractical under the specific
circumstances."' 6 Thus, Hicks may be read as creating a "bright-line"
rule that probable cause must support warrantless searches of homes
justified by exigent circumstances.
107
Moreover, to have probable cause to search, the police must
reasonably believe that they will find the item in the place to be
searched."~ This requirement carries with it an element of particu-
larity.1° Police may not, for example, search every apartment in a
building because they have a reasonable belief that someone in the
building has a gun. Instead, police will have probable cause to search
only if they reasonably believe that the gun is in a particular apart-
ment.110 In other words, courts have held that unit-by-unit searches
of buildings without probable cause as to each individual apartment
violate the Fourth Amendment."'
106. Seesupra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining thatwhen speed is of essence and
thus obtaining warrant would be impractical, exigency may exist).
107. See Winsor, 846 F.2d at 1574 (interpreting Hicks as "adopt[ing] a bright-line rule
requiring probable cause to support a search of a dwelling" and therefore finding that search
of room was unconstitutional because, although exigent circumstances existed, there was not
requisite probable cause).
108. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (delineating probable cause standard).
109. See United States v. Votteller, 544 F.2d 1355, 1363 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding search
warrant that allowed police to search entire three-story residence when police had probable
cause to search only first floor invalid); cf. United States v. Olt, 492 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1974)
(finding sufficient probable cause to search two apartments where affidavit linked seller of
controlled substances to both apartments). In United States v. Hinton, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained this particularity requirement in detail:
For purposes of satisfying the Fourth Amendment, searching two or more apartments
in the same building is no different than searching two or more completely separate
houses. Probable cause must be shown for searching each house or ... each
apartment.... [P]robable cause must be shown for searching each residence unless
it be shown that, although appearing to be a building of several apartments, the entire
building is actually being used as a single unit.
United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1955).
110. See, eg., United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
.occupants of each apartment... [have an] independent right to be free from unreasonable
search [es]" and that searches are improper "in the absence of probable cause to believe that the
robbers were present in that particular apartment"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976); Winsor,
846 F.2d at 1572 (finding that each room in low-rent residential hotel "enjoyed its own zone of
Fourth Amendment protection" and that probable cause was necessary to search regardless of
whether exigent circumstances existed); Hinton, 219 F.2d at 326-27 (invalidating warrant to
search entire building when police did not have probable cause to search each particular
apartment for alleged drug sellers).
111. See supra note 110 (noting cases in which Court has held that unit-by-unit searches
without probable cause for each unit violate Fourth Amendment).
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3. Administrative searches
The Fourth Amendment applies to searches of homes and
businesses conducted for administrative purposes. 12  The Supreme
Court has defined administrative inspections as "routine inspection [s)
of the physical condition of private property.""' Typical administra-
tive searches include building inspections for housing"14 and fire
code violations," 5 and inspections of fire-devastated property to
determine the cause of the fire."' For example, following Camara
v. Municipal Court,"7 authorities must acquire a vrarrant in order to
conduct area-wide housing code inspections of private residences"'
because the Court considers such inspections "significant intrusions
upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. "" 9 The
Court, however, has replaced the traditional probable cause test for
warrants to conduct such administrative inspections with a less
demanding probable cause test,'1° indicating that the public interest
justifies the intrusion sought if "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection" apply to the particular
dwelling.12 ' Thus, in recognizing the public interest in administra-
112. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that administrative
searches of home are protected by FourthAmendment); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,543 (1957)
(deciding that business-like residences are protected by Fourth Amendment); we, aLso Michigan
v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287,295 (1984) (finding warrant necessary to conduct administrative search
of fire damaged homes).
113. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
114. See id. at 526-27 (analyzing constitutionality of%-arrantless inspections of home designed
to discover violations of city housing code).
115. Seid. at541 (consideringconstitutionalityofuarrantlesssearch of business forfire code
violations).
116. See Ckfford, 464 U.S. at 290-91 (determining validity of wanrantess search conducted
after house fire).
117. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
118. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,539 (1967).
119. Id at534.
120. I. at 535. The Court held that the probable cause standard for administrative searches
should be "weighed in terms of the[] reasonable goals of code enforcement." Id. The Court
clarified that the "unique character" of the inspection programs allowed for this relaxed
standard for judging the reasonableness of a wvarrantless search. Id. at 534. The Court
distinguished administrative inspections from criminal searches indicating that the formerserved
an important public interest, "city-vwide compliance with minimum ph)ical standards for private
property." I& at 535. The goal of the inspections "is to prevent even the unintentional
development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety" and not to prevent
crime. I&; se also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 75, at 217-19 (contrasting police searches for
evidence with housing inspections authorized in Camara and concluding that criminal searches
are more intrusive because they take more time, involve "rummaging through private papers and
effects," may affect reputation of person being searched, may be conducted at any time, are
often conducted by surprise, and are done by armed officers).
121. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. The Court further stated that even though the wrrant
requirement applies to administrative inspections, "in the case of most routine area inspection?
a warrant should be secured only after a resident has refused to allow entry. id.
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tive searches, the Court made it easier to obtain a warrant to perform
an administrative inspection than to conduct a criminal search.
In addition, warrantless administrative inspections of businesses do
not violate the Fourth Amendment if performed on a "pervasively
regulated business" pursuant to a well-delineated statute.122  The
Supreme Court held that inspections of pervasively regulated
industries may be constitutional even if a collateral goal of the
administrative inspection was the discovery of evidence of criminal
acts. 123  In allowing warrantless inspections, however, the Court has
clearly emphasized that such searches are reasonable, in part, because
the privacy interests enjoyed by owners of pervasively regulated
commercial businesses "differ[] significantly from the sanctity
accorded an individual's home."2 4
The Supreme Court has also found that warrantless home visitations
by government agents, pursuant to a valid statute, were not barred by
the Fourth Amendment. In Wyman v. James,'" the Supreme Court
held that "home visitation s]" by social workers, employed by the
government to ensure compliance with Aid to Families with Depen-
122. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); see also id. at 711 (finding warrantless
administrative searches of junkyards constitutional because searches fell "within the well-
established exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of 'closely
regulated' businesses"); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (determining that
warrantless searches of underground mine pursuant to valid regulatory scheme do not violate
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (holding warrantless
search of pawn shop for unregistered guns valid); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (explaining that Congress may delineate "standards of reasonableness
for searches and seizure" in pervasively regulated liquor business). In Burger, the Court laid out
a three-part test to determine whether a statute permitting warrantless searches of a particular
industry fit within constitutional boundaries: (1) the government must have a substantial
interest in regulating the industry, (2) the searches must be necessary to further this interest;
and (3) the statute must provide some of the basic functions of a warrant, such as giving notice
to the subjects of the search, limiting the discretion of the inspectors, as well as limiting the
time, place, and manner of the search. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03.
123. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716. In Burger, the Supreme Court found that "[t]he discovery of
evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not
render that search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect." Id In that case, police officers
inspected an automobilejunkyard pursuant to a state statute authorizing such inspections. Id.
at 693-95. After establishing that the proprietor of the junkyard did not have a license or a
record of the cars in thejunkyard, the police inspected the vehicles and found that some were
stolen. Id. at 695-96. The proprietor was arrested and charged with possessing stolen property.
I/. at 695. The Court found that the police's warrantless search which turned up the evidence
of stolen vehicles was proper because it occurred during a valid administrative inspection of the
junkyard pursuant to a proper regulatory scheme. Id. at 716.
124. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598-99; see also Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (explaining that although
junkyard owner has legitimate expectation of privacy on commercial premises, expectation is le5s
than that in individual's home); BisweI 406 U.S. at 317 (noting that privacy interest of firearms
dealers was limited because of urgent regulatory interests of government). But cf California V.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 395 (1985) (finding varrantless search of "fully mobile 'motor home'
located in a public place" reasonable).
125. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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dent Children (AFDC) regulations, were "reasonable administrative
tool[s]."12 1 In so doing, however, the Court emphasized that it did
not consider these "interviews" as true Fourth Amendment search-
es.121 In addition, the Court indicated that the privacy interest
affected was minimal and that the visits were reasonable, in part,
because "snooping in the home during the visitations was forbid-
den."'
2
4. Special needs exception
The Supreme Court has held that when "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable," officials may conduct warrantless
searches that are not based on probable cause." In such circum-
stances, the court balances the government's interest in maintaining
order with the individuals' privacy and security interests.' When
the government's interest outweighs the individuals' privacy interest,
searches conducted without a warrant or probable cause satisfy the
Fourth Amendment as long as they are reasonable.1 31
The Court has applied the special needs exception when facts of
the case have met certain criteria. First, the warrant/probable cause
126. Wyman v.James, 400 US. 309, 326 (1971).
127. Md at 317-18.
128. Id. at 321. The Court also emphasized that the visits were not part of any criminal
investigation, no "actual or suspected perpetrators ofcrime" were involved, and that caseworkers,
not "uniformed authorit[ies]," visited the AFDC recipients. Id. at 322-23.
129. New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); se= aLso
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (determining that
warrantless urine tests of government employees applying forjobs that involve drug interdiction
or carrying firearms are reasonable because ofspecial government interest in ensuring that drug
users are not promoted to such positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 US.
602, 622 (1989) (finding safety needs justified uarrantless drug-testing of railroad workers);
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (explaining that special law enforcement needs
justified warrantless search of probationer's home); O'Connor v. Ortega. 480 U.S. 709, 725
(1987) (holding that special needs justified searches of employees' desks and offices).
130. See ag., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633 (noting that government's "compelling interest in
safety of railroads must be balanced with employees' privacy interest); Gnffin, 483 U.S. at 875
(balancing probationer's privacy interest with government need to ensure compliance with
probation); T.LO., 469 US. at 341 (stating that child's privacy right must be weighed against
"substantial [interest] of teachers and administrators"); Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013.1015-
16 (10th Cir. 1995) (weighing need to intercept drugs before visitors enter prison with visitors'
expectation of privacy in car).
131. See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340-41 (stating that "'probable cause' is not an irreducible
requirement of a valid search" and that in context of school, "reasonableness" standard vas
appropriate). In fact, the Court in Irn Raab made clear that when special governmental needs
exist, "neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized
suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance." Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 665; see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,447 (1990) (holding
that state's use of highway sobriety checkpoints to stop cars passing through designated
checkpoints did not violate Fourth Amendment).
192519951
1926 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1903
requirement must frustrate the government's aim or reduce the
deterrent effect of a search.3 For example, the Supreme Court has
held that the warrant requirement "is unsuited to the school
environment," emphasizing that the requirement "unduly interfere [s]"
with the necessary disciplinary actions of the school."
Second, a distinctive relationship must exist between the govern-
ment actor and the individual searched.'8' For example, in Griffin
v. Wisconsin,s the Court applied the special needs exception to a
warrantless search of a probationer's home."s The Court empha-
sized that the search of a probationer's home fits under the special
needs exception because of the supervisory relationship between the
probation officer and the probationer.3 7 The Court compared the
probation official-probationer relationship with the parent-child
relationship, and analogized that requiring a warrant for a search of
a probationer's home would be like requiring a parent to obtain a
warrant to search a child's room."a The Court stressed that the
officer searches the probationer's home with "the welfare of the
probationer" in mind." 9 The Court made clear, however, that this
type of supervision permits "a degree of impingement upon privacy
that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large."
140
132. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-24 (noting that warrant process would frustrate "the
objectives of the Government's [drug] testing program"); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667 (explaining
that Customs Service does not make discretionary determination to search based on judgment
that certain conditions exist and therefore cannot provide facts necessary to obtain warrant from
magistrate); Gtiffin, 483 U.S. at 879 (emphasizing that requiring probable cause would be
"unrealistic and destructive" to probation system); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 721 (suggesting that
warrant requirement to enter offices and search desks of public employees would be unworkable
when one takes into consideration "the realities of the workplace"); T.LO., 469 U.S. at 340
(noting that warrant requirement would "unduly interfere" with need for discipline in school).
133. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
134. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 (explaining that government must monitor railroad
employees to ensure travel safety); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 (discussing supervisory relationship
between probationer and probation officer); O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 724 (noting that government
employers must ensure that employees conduct their work efficiently and properly and must
watch for employee misconduct); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (emphasizing uniqueness of
teacher/student relationship).
135. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
136. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870 (1987).
137. Id. at 875.
138. 1& at 876.
139. 1M; see Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1993) (declining to apply special
needs exception to warrantless search by police of child's vaginal area to determine whether
child was victim of abuse because police focus was not so much on welfare of child but on
criminal culpability of parents).
140. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. The Court also noted that although the privacy expectation is
lesser, the "permissible degree" of privacy impingement is not unlimited. Id.
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Third, in special needs cases the individual searched typically has
a reduced expectation of privacy under the circumstances. 4 1  In
Griffin, the Court stressed that probationers "do not enjoy 'the
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled. '" " Thus, the
probationers have a lesser constitutional expectation of privacy that
is conditioned on certain special restrictions.'4
I. ANALxYsis
A. The CUA's Sweeps Policy Is Uncmstitutional
Because the CHA sweeps policy authorizes warrantless searches of
the homes of tenants living in CHA housing,'" the policy must be
analyzed with a presumption of unconstitutionality." Furthermore,
as the analysis below demonstrates, the policy does not pass constitu-
tional muster under the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement.
The CHA has argued that because officials requested the consent
of the tenants of the developments before searching and because
most of these tenants signed consent forms, the searches were
constitutional." The CHA's sweeps policy, however, clearly does
not fit within the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Although some of the searches the CHA police performed were
141. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (assuming that
because sobriety stop is brief, degree of intrusion on motorists is reduced); SV.'nner, 489 U.S. at
627 (holding that expectation of reduced rights comes with employment in highly regulated
industry); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 (determining that Customs Service employees who are
directly involved in drug interdiction or who are required to carry guns have diminished
expectations of privacy with respect to being subject to urinalysis); Guflin, 483 U.S. at 873-74
(stating that probationers have reduced constitutional rights); O'Connor, 480 US. at 717
(indicating that public employee's expectation of privacy may be reduced depending on
practices, procedures, and regulations of office); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Poivell,J., concurring)
(noting that "students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than
members of the population generally).
142. Giffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 403 U.S. 471,480 (1972)).
143. Id. at 874-75; s also Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1015-16 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding that expectation of privacy of persons visiting prisons is diminished due to need for
prison security).
144. See supra Part IA (describing CHA policy).
145. See Payton v. NewYork, 445 U.S. 573,586-90 (1980) (distinguishing, arantless searches
in home from other types of searches and finding that "Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
line at the entrance to the house [and] ... [t]hat threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant"); see also supra Part HA (discussing presumption of unconstitutionality for
warrantless searches of homes).
146. See Response Memorandum of the Chicago Housing Authority at 4-5, Pratt v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Il. 1994) (No. 93 C 6985); s also supra Part LA (describing
CHA's emphasis on fact that many residents supported and consented to searches).
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conducted pursuant to the valid consent of individual tenants,14 the
policy authorized officials to search all units, regardless of whether the
police obtained consent from the particular tenant of the unit to be
searched." s The CHA officials, in fact, searched the home of at
least one individual who did not sign the consent form,149 and,
additionally, the homes of individuals who could not consent because
they were not at home at the time of the searches. 10
The searches conducted pursuant to the sweeps policy also did not
fit within the narrow requirements of the exigency exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. First, although the specific
incidents of gunfire' may arguably have created exigent circum-
stances, the failure of the CHA to respond immediately to the
situation negated such a claim."5 2 Of the searches that occurred in
July and August 1993, none occurred within forty-eight hours of a
shooting.5 ' This time lapse demonstrates that the CHA police did
not conduct the searches in order to immediately apprehend a
criminal, or to protect its officers or the public from a potential
threat. If the CHA truly was responding to the exigency of the
147. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that warrantless searches are constitutional if pursuant
to voluntary consent). Other factors such as how the police represented themselves to tie
tenants when asking to conduct the searches and whether the tenants had actual knowledge of
their Fourth Amendment right to be free of vrarrantless searches were not brought up by
plaintiffs in the Pratt complaint and will not be discussed here because there are no facts to
indicate coercive tactics on the part of CHA. The argument that the sweeps policy does not fit
within the consent exception to warrantless searches relies on the fact that both in theory and
in practice the policy authorized searches regardless of consent. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining
requirements for voluntary consent).
148. SeeMemorandum in Support of Request forAuthority to Perform Warrantless Searches
at 3-4, Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth. (N.D. IlI. Dec. 16, 1988) (No. 88 C 10566) ("All
apartments in the building or buildings involved will be searched.").
149. See Response Memorandum of the Chicago Housing Authority at 2, Pratt (No. 93 C
6985). CHA contends that oral consent was given by this individual. Id. at 2-3. The opposing
party contends that she told the CHA officers that "she did not want them to search her
apartment." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 1, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985).
150. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793-94.
151. The CHA indicated that its policy authorized the sweeps when continuous gunfire or
other weapons related incidents have occurred in a development under CHA's authority,
Response Memorandum of the Chicago Housing Authority at 2, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985).
152. See Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 794-95 (noting that exigent circumstances exception
necessitates "extreme immediate urgency" and finding that, because sweeps occurred several
days after incident of gunfire, exigent circumstances did not exist); Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 6. Pratt (No. 93 C
6985) (arguing that CHA had ample time to obtain warrants but instead substituted Chairman
of CHA for neutral magistrate). In its Response Memorandum, the CHA does not address the
issue of speed as an element of exigency but states only that this exception should apply because
"[a] weapon in a CHA highrise is a deadly, menacing situation." Response Memorandum of the
Chicago Housing Authority at 13, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985); see also supra notes 96, 100 and
accompanying text (explaining that speed is essential element of exigency),
153. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793.
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circumstances created by sniper fire, then speed would have been an
essential component of the searches.'-
Second, pursuant to the policy, the officials searched "entire
building(s)," 55 apartment-by-apartment, with no reason to believe
that the gunfire had originated from any particular dwelling. In fact,
the CHA believed that the sweep searches were necessary precisely
because the CHA police could not pinpoint where the gunfire
originated."5 6 The CHA's policy, therefore, disregards the probable
cause requirement of the exigency exception by allowing searches of
every apartment rather than targeting only the homes where officials
have probable cause to believe that individuals present were involved
in the illegal activity.5 ' Without probable cause as to each particu-
lar apartment, even if the CHA police had responded immediately to
the gunfire, the exigency exception to the warrant requirement would
not justify the sweep searches.
The CHA did have the authority to conduct emergency adinnistra-
tive inspections of apartment units to check their condition pursuant
to a prior agreement made between the CHA and the tenants.l1s
The searches that the CHA conducted during the summer of 1993,
however, were not administrative in nature and thus did not fall
within the terms of the agreement. In instituting the sweeps policy,
the CHA intended to broaden its power, authorizing its officials to
154. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (stressing that exigency exception only
applies if police do not have time to obtain warrant).
155. Response Memorandum of the Chicago HousingAuthority at 2, Pratt (No. 93 C 6935).
156. See i. (outlining procedure for searches sparked by gunfire in projects when CHA is
unable to identify specific location from which it originated).
157. See Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 795-96 ("Without any probable cause for searching particular
apartments, the searches under the [sweeps] are unconstitutional, no matter how exigent the
circumstances."); see also United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that
police had probable cause to search apartment where they had reason to believe that fugitives
had entered building and had knowledge that fugitives were not in other six apartments), cert.
deniAd, 423 U.S. 1056 (1976); see also supra note 75 (defining probable cause); supra note 102
(indicating that probable cause is requirement of exigency search).
158. See Consent Decree app. B at 1-2, 6-7, Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth. (N.D. Ill. Dc.
16, 1988) (No. 88 C 10566) (authorizing "emergency' inspections "to identify and remove
unauthorized occupants" and "to examine the condition of floors, ceilings, walls, electrical
wiring, heating sources, windows, window frames, doors, locks ... and other structural
elements"). These inspections closely resemble the type of administrative inspection examined
in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See supra Part ILB.3 and accompan)ing
notes (describing administrative inspections).
The CHA did, however, attempt to argue that tenants in the development consented to the
sweeps searches when they signed a consent clause in their leases, authorizing inspections at all
times without prior notice. Response Memorandum of the Chicago Housing Authority at 5-6.
Pratt (No. 93 C 6985). The plaintiffs, however, convincingly pointed out that this argument v, as
a "red herring" because the consent clause in the lease only applied to the type of emergency
administrative inspections agreed upon in Summerai Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiffi' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 6-7. Patt
(No. 93 C 6985).
1930 THE AMERICAN UNIVERsITY LAw RE Ew [Vol. 44:1903
conduct law enforcement searches aimed at finding illegal weapons
and arresting individuals involved in criminal activity. In fact, the
intrusive nature of the sweep searches far exceeds the types of
administrative searches envisioned by the Supreme Court.'
Pursuant to the policy, the CHA police have conducted invasive
examinations of personal effects, drawers, closets, and cabinets in the
home of CHA tenants."6 Even if one of the purposes of the sweeps
is safety, the scope of such searches goes far beyond that of ordinary
administrative searches, such as inspections for "faulty wiring"161 or
"unsafe, hazardous or unsanitary conditions"16 2 in which officials
look for visible violations of housing codes.
The weapons searches also cannot be equated with the warrantless
searches allowed in pervasively regulated industries.'1 The sweeps
159. SeeNewYork v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,700 (1987) (explaining that expectation of privacy
exists with respect to police searches and administrative searches of highly regulated business);
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,598-600 (1981) (allowing administrative searches ofcommerclal
property, but distinguishing privacy interests of home and work); see also California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386,393 (1985) (allowing warrantless search of mobile home because vehicle is readily
mobile and expectation of privacy is diminished because licensed vehicle is subject to regulations
that do not apply to homes); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543-44 (1967) (concluding that
decreased expectation of privacy at place of business does not eliminate need for warrants).
160. Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 1, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985).
161. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. In fact, the Consent Decree specifically prohibits searches of
personal effects, and only allows for searches for deterioration, etc. of the units. See Consent
Decree app. B at 6-7, Summeries (No. 88 C 10566) (describing inspections allowed under Consent
Decree).
162. Consent Decree app. B at 6-7, Summeries (No. 88 C 10566). The Consent Decree
explicitly stated that "CHA staff may not examine the personal property of CHA tenants or their
guests, or the contents of such property, including- bureau or dresser drawers; closets; bed
clothes; clothing; boxes; or other containers." Id. app. B at 7. Instead it allowed officials to
inspect the "condition" of the apartment, for example the ceiling, floors, heating sources, etc,
bi. app. B at 6-7. These are the type of inspections envisioned by the Court in Camara. In
Camara, the Court considered inspections aimed at "securing city-wide compliance with
minimum physical standards for private property." C(amara, 387 U.S. at 535. It distinguished
such inspections from searches made pursuant to a criminal investigation. Id. The Court
pointed out that the inspections were meant to stop conditions that might become hazardous
to public health and safety, not to prevent criminal activity. Id.
163. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03 (laying out three-part test for analyzing issue of whether
searches allowed by particular regulatory scheme meet requirements of Fourth Amendment).
First, the government must have a substantial interest in regulating the industry. Id. at 702.
Second, the regulation authorizing the search must "reasonably serve the [government's]
substantial interest" in the regulatory scheme. Xd at 702, 709. Third, the regulation must
provide a constitutionally acceptable substitute for a warrant. Id. at 703. One could argue that
the standard delineated in Burger should be applied in this case. The facts,, however, are
distinguishable. Burger applied to "closely regulated" businesses with a "tradition of close
government supervision." Id at 700 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 513
(1978)). Criminally relevant evidence was discovered, but was a collateral result of the
inspection. I& at 712-13. In this case, the sweeps policy applies not to a traditional business,
but to a publicly owned dwelling rented for private use. Moreover, the explicit purpose of the
searches-to uncover guns used in shooting in the housing developments-was for law
enforcement, not to further a regulatory scheme as in Burger. Response Memorandum of the
Chicago Housing Authority at 9, Pratt (No. 93 C 6985).
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policy authorized searches of residential apartments. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that the expectation of privacy is greatest in the
home and far exceeds any privacy expectation an individual has at a
place of business." The Court distinguished warrantless searches
of pervasively regulated industries from dwelling searches, indicating
that the administrative inspections are acceptable, in part, because
they are far less intrusive than a full-scale dwelling search."
The Court's decision in Wyman v. James does not change the
conclusion that the sweeps were not administrative searches." In
Wyman, the Court emphasized that visits by caseworkers to the homes
of AFDC recipients were more like interviews than searches and that
they were non-invasive.6  The CHA sweeps, however, are intrusive
law enforcement searches that directly impinge on the tenants' privacy
interests. The CHA, therefore, cannotjustify its warrantless searches
of apartments by claiming that the searches were administrative
inspections.
The strongest argument in favor of the sweeps policy is that the
government has a special need for instituting this policy, namely safety
in the housing developments, that outweighs the tenants' privacy
concerns.11 Clearly, the government has a substantial interest in
ensuring the safety of the residents of the developments, whose lives
are threatened by the occurrence of random gunfire. The argument
in favor of the constitutionality of the sweeps, thus, is that, like the
government's interest in maintaining order in public schools,'
ensuring that railroad workers are drug free, 70 and supervising
probationers,17 1 the CHA's interest in safety justifies the privacy
intrusion created by the sweeps. This argument is unconvincing,
however. The sweeps are easily distinguishable from the cases in
164. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing diminished privacy interest in
"closely regulated" businesses).
165. See Burger 482 U.S. at 700 (stressing that expectation ofprhacy in home far exceeds
expectation at business).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28.
167. Wyman v.James, 400 US. 309,317-18 (1971). The Court held that '[tlhe caeworker
is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend to one in need." Id. at 323; sa aLo Franz v. Lytle,
997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing police officer's search ofchild's bodyfor signs
of abuse from social worker's concern for child's welfare).
168. See supra Part II.B.4 and accompanying text (discussing balancing test pursuant to
special needs exception to warrant requirement).
169. See NewJersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325,340 (1985) (explaining thatgovernment interests
in keeping order justified searching student's purse).
170. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (highlighting
similarity between government need to monitor railroad employee to ensure safety and
government need to supervise probationer or regulate schools).
171. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (finding that government has special
need to supervise probationers).
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which the Supreme Court has held that special government needs
exist.
First, the evidence does not show that obtaining a warrant will
unduly frustrate the aim of making the housing developments safer.
The CHA instituted its sweeps policy as a means of responding
immediately to dangerous situations in the developments."'
Theoretically, the threat of immediate full-scale searches of the
development may deter some criminals, and the searches themselves
may lead to some arrests, thereby making the areas safer. In practice,
however, the CHA conducted all of the searches more than forty-eight
hours after reported gunfire because of the logistical difficulties
associated with assembling enough police officers to search all of the
units.173 Thus, the argument that the warrant requirement frustrat-
ed the goals of the policy is unconvincing. Instead it seems the
CHA's goals were unrealistic given the CHA's resources.
Second, the relationship between the CHA officials and the tenants
is not the type of relationship that justifies the special needs excep-
tion. In cases in which the Supreme Court has held that the special
government interest in the search outweighs the privacy interest of
the person to be searched, the Court has emphasized the existence
of a supervisory relationship between the government actor and the
searchee.' 74 In such cases, the government actor has the power to
ensure that the person searched is complying with certain rules or
procedures.1 75  No such relationship exists, or ought to exist,
between the CHA and its tenants. The CHA does have the authority
to maintain a safe living environment in the projects, 17 but it does
not have specific supervisory authority over its individual tenants. The
tenants who live in public-assisted housing are no different than the
tenants who live in middle- or high-income neighborhoods-all are
"the public at large," 77 free to live their lives as they choose within
172. See supra Part IA (describing CHA's claim that sweeps would be conducted in response
to gunfire to protect residents).
173. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 793 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
174. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing special relationship Court looks
for in applying special needs exception to warrant requirement).
175. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 (justifying drug testing for railroad enployees because of
need to ensure safety); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 (explaining that goals of probation "justify the
exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions [of the probation] are ... observed");
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (explaining that school authorities' responsibilities toward students "is
one of personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for his education").
176. See Housing Authorities Act, ILL. ANN. SrAT. ch. 310, para. 10/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(creating housing authority "to promote and protect the health, safety, morals and welfare of
the public").
177. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 (distinguishing public-at-large from probationer and explaining
that supervisory relationship allows greater impingement on constitutional rights).
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the bounds of the law. Thus, the special supervisory relationship
required to trigger the special needs exception should not be
applicable in the landlord-tenant context.
Third, the tenants of low-income housing developments do not
have a reduced expectation of privacy." a Unlike a probationer or
a student, tenants living in low-income housing enjoy "'the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled.'"", The fact that some
individuals within the developments engage in illegal activity should
have no bearing on a tenant's right to privacy." A tenant, regard-
less of where he lives, has the "ight... to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion. ' ""' To
argue the contrary would be to set up different constitutional
standards for privacy, dependent on the type of housing an individual
can afford and the crime rate of the neighborhood.
Because the sweeps policy does not meet the criteria set out by the
Supreme Court in its special needs cases, the special needs exception
to the Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant and probable
cause is not applicable in determining the constitutional status of the
sweeps policy. Therefore, even though the government has a
substantial interest in protecting the public from the violence in the
housing developments, this interest does not justify the intrusive
nature of the sweeps no matter how popular the sweeps may be. As
the court pointed out in Pratt; the tenants who are willing to trade
their constitutional rights to be free from warrantless searches for
178. See Smith, supranote 6. at531-32 (stating that from property lawvewmpoint, expectation
of privacy is same in public housing as in private home).
179. Griffin, 483 US. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
180. See United States v. Burnett, 890 F.2d 1233, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (outlining standard
to determine whether person has legitimate expectation of privacy). The test is whether the
person: (1) has a possessory interest in the place searched; (2) can exclude others from the
place; (3) has a subjective expectation of privacy; (4) attempts to maintain privacy, and (5) v,.
legitimately on premises. I& (citing United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir.
1983)). Clearly, CHA tenants who pay rent have a possessory interest in their apartments. Like
all other tenants, they can exclude others from entering their apartments and expect privcy in
their homes.
181. Payton v. NewYork, 445 U.S. 573,590 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 355
U.S. 505,511 (1961)). A historical footnote in Payton is especially relev-ant to the argument that
low-income tenants should not have a reduced expectation of privacy.
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;,
the rain may enter, but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dare not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement"
Id. at 601 n.54 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)); see atso Brand v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 120 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1941) (explaining that tenancy agreement
between public housing authority and low-income person is same as between two private actors).
See gneraly Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin, Are tkPoorEntitltd to Pitay?, 8 HARV.
BLAcKLETrERJ. 181 (1991) (examining how Supreme Court has treated privacy rights of poor
people).
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safety cannot impose this trade-off on their neighbors."8 2 Instead,
"government officials charged with providing safe housing" must find
solutions that do not erode constitutional rights."a
B. The Clinton Guidelines Create Several Constitutional Problems
The goal of the Clinton Guidelines is to present "options available
to a public housing agency such as CHA in conducting searches on
the premises of public housing projects" that do not violate the
constitutional rights of the tenants of the projects.&81 The wording
of the Guidelines suggests that the Clinton administration had the
special needs doctrine in mind when drafting the recommendations.
The preamble of the Guidelines, for example, states that the policy
options presented are "constitutionally valid, at least in the extraordinary
circumstances presented by the crime problem in the ... develop-
ments.""a This statement implies that because of the level of the
violence in the projects, the government has a significant interest in
securing the buildings. This interest, then, justifies the searches'
infringement on the tenants' right to privacy. Furthermore, the
Guidelines recommend that providing advanced notice of when the
housing authorities will search and performing the searches during
"daylight hours" will reduce "any constitutional objection to the
inspection."186 The argument here is that if the tenants know about
the warrantless searches in advance and if the searches only occur in
the daytime, the searches somehow will be less intrusive than the
searches conducted pursuant to the sweeps policy.
In addition, the Guidelines note that housing authorities should
seek the tenant association's endorsement of the searches, reasoning
that "widespread tenant support would be helpful in responding to
challenges by particular tenants to the constitutionality of... consent
clauses in leases."187 Thus, the Clinton administration contends that
if most of the tenants support the searches, this support makes the
searches of units belonging to tenants who did not lend support
somehow more constitutionally justifiable.
The warrantless searches suggested by the Clinton Guidelines,
however, are not significantly different from those authorized under
the CHA sweeps policy; the Guidelines recommend conducting
182. Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 796 (N.D. Il1. 1994).
183. ML at 797.
184. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
185. Reno Letter, supra note 19 (emphasis added).
186. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
187. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
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warrantless unit-by-unit searches for guns. The special needs
exception to the warrant requirement, therefore, cannot excuse the
threat to the tenants' right to privacy that the searches pose.'6
First, if advance notice is given and the searches are conducted during
the day, then the warrant requirement does not frustrate the aim of
the searches."s  If housing authority officials have time to give
advance notice to their tenants as to when searches will occur and can
orchestrate the searches to occur only during the day, the officials
should also be able to secure warrants to conduct the searches.
Second, the Guidelines do not change the fact that no supervisory
relationship exists between the tenants and the housing authority190
As argued above, the relationship between the tenants and the
housing authority is not similar, for example, to the relationship of a
probation officer to a probationer or a school official to a student.
Finally, the Guidelines' suggestion that the "extraordinary circum-
stances" created by the violence in the developments diminishes the
tenant's privacy right is a dangerous one. The analysis here is the
same as when considering the sweeps policy in the context of the
special needs exception. The argument that public housing tenants
have a reduced privacy expectation is dangerous because it allows the
erosion of the right to privacy by making this Fourth Amendment
right contingent on the neighborhood in which a person lives and the
crime rate in that neighborhood.19'
The Clinton Guidelines do not rely solely on the special neeils
exception to justify the warrantless searches outlined in the Guide-
lines. The Clinton administration also attempts to fit the searches
within other exceptions to the warrant requirement. In fact, the most
troubling aspect of the Clinton Guidelines is the provision that
recommends that housing authorities place a consent clause in public
housing leases."9 One problem with this provision is that it is an
188. See supra notes 168-83 and accompanying text (discussing special needs exception to
warrant requirement).
189. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (arguing that under special needs
exception, warrant requirement must frustrate government interest and does not do so under
sweeps).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 174-77 (stating that no special relationship exists
between CHA and tenants for purposes of special needs exception).
191. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text (stressing that special needs exception
requires diminished expectation of privacy, which does not exist in context of low-income
tenants).
192. Reno Letter, supra note 19 (suggesting that consent searches are essential in high-crime
areas).
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attempt to characterize the sweep searches as minimally intrusive
administrative inspections. 93
The Guidelines state that when criminal incidents make searches of
the developments necessary, "lease consent clauses could be employed
to authorize periodic administrative inspections of tenants' units for
unlicensed or unauthorized firearms." 194 The Clinton Guidelines
compare these "inspections" to maintenance inspections, and suggest
that "inspections" be conducted on a "routine basis, during the
daylight hours," and that they be "no more intrusive than absolutely
necessary to determine" the existence of weapons in the unit.195
This wording is a clear attempt to de-emphasize the law enforce-
ment purpose behind the searches and to recast the searches in
administrative inspections terms. This attempt, however, is misguided.
Although criminal charges may be made incident to administrative
inspections," 6 the Supreme Court has made clear that such warrant-
less inspections are only valid when conducted in accordance with a
statute designed to regulate commercial property and that the
primary purpose of the inspection must be to find regulatory
infractions and not criminal wrongdoing.'" The searches suggested
by the Guidelines, however, are searches of homes triggered by
criminal incidents in the housing developments. 9 ' Thus, the
primary purpose of the so-called gun inspections is to stop crime, not
to look for regulatory infractions.
The Guidelines also suggest that the inspections be only as intrusive
as necessary.' This standard is vague and gives no assurances that
the searches will be "a less hostile intrusion" than a normal criminal
search."° In fact, as evidenced by the searches conducted by the
CHA during the summer of 1993, a search for a gun is intrusive.
20 1
193. See supra Part I.B (outlining provisions of Clinton Guidelines).
194. Reno Letter, supra note 19 (emphasis added).
195. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
196. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 (1987) (holding that discovery of evidence
of crimes incident to proper administrative search does not make search unconstitutional); sea
also supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (discussing Burger decision).
197. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing administrative searches).
198. See Reno Letter, supra note 19 (stating that crime conditions may make inspections
.essential").
199. Reno Letter, supranote 19 (limiting searches to extent necessary to determine presence
of weapons).
200. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,530 (1967) (distinguishing administrative
searches as "less hostile intrusion[s] than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and
instrumentalities of crime").
201. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 1, Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. II. 1994) (No.
93 C 6985) (characterizing search of one tenant's home as turning her"home upside down" and
maintaining that CHA police "combed the unit" searching cabinets, dresser drawers, private
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Such searches involved looking through drawers, cabinets, personal
effects, in refrigerators, and under mattresses.' They are far more
intrusive than the administrative searches currently allowed, such as
inspections of the walls and ceilings for signs of maintenance
problems.0 3 Moreover, the "administrative inspections" suggested
by the Guidelines are more invasive than the home visits allowed in
Wyman v. James.2° The Guidelines suggest ways to conduct police
searches of homes, not visits by housing officials or social workers.21
In addition, the Guidelines recommend exactly the type of "snooping"
search that the AFDC statute in Wyman explicitly forbade."5 The
searches described in the Guidelines, therefore, are not true
administrative searches under Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence and
should not be characterized as such.
The issue of whether the searches are administrative or criminal in
nature is irrelevant, however, if the searches are conducted pursuant
to valid consent.207 Thus, another issue created by the Guidelines
is whether a signed lease containing a consent clause provides a valid
waiver to future searches for guns.203 If such consent is valid, then
all searches conducted pursuant to this consent are constitutional.
2
0
The first question that arises in the context of whether a signed
consent clause constitutes a valid waiver of one's Fourth Amendment
rights is whether the consent is voluntary.210 In answering this
question, courts look to the totality of the circumstances.11 In this
case, a number of factors lead to the conclusion that consent is not
voluntary.
papers, personal effects, closed boxes and containers, refrigerator, and under mattresses and
sofa pillous).
202. Id.
203. See supra note 162 (noting scope of search under Consent Decree).
204. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971) (explaining that home visits bi
caseworkers were more similar to interviews than searches).
205. See Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1993) (differentiating search by police
from visit by social worker to home).
206. Wjman, 400 U.S. at 321.
207. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (noting that neither warrant
nor probable cause are required when consent to search is given).
208. There is an argument that the current administrative inspection consent clause in the
leases, the constitutional validity of which is not challenged, illustrates that consent to search
given in the leases may be valid. This argument fails to consider, however, the difference
between administrative inspections authorized under the Consent Decree and the gun.related
inspections recommended in the Clinton Guidelines. The gun.related searches are far more
intrusive than the administrative inspections. These gun-related searches spark a heightened
level of scrutiny because of the privacy interest at stake. Scesupm Part LA (stating that mrrant-
less searches of homes are presumptively unconstitutional).
209. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining that warrantless searches conducted pursuant to valid
consent are not unconstitutional).
210. See supra Part ILB.1 (explaining that consent is only valid if voluntary).
211. Bustamrte 412 U.S. at 226.
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If signing the consent form is indeed a requirement of living in the
development,212 a subtle form of coercion is at play. Requiring a
tenant to sign this consent form does not constitute the use of
physical force or the threat to use physical force, two factors the
Supreme Court considered in determining whether consent was the
product of coercion."' Nevertheless, the Court noted that subtle
forms of coercion may prove that consent was not voluntarily
given. 14 In looking for "subtle coercion," it is important to consid-
er the relevance of certain personal characteristics of the consenter,
such as the individual's financial status." 5 The tenants who live in
and seek housing in low-income developments are poor, and often
have no choice but to live in publicly subsidized housing because they
are unable to afford any other housing.216 Conditioning their
eligibility to live in the developments on waiving their Fourth
Amendment rights leaves the tenants in an untenable position. The
tenants are likely to feel coerced into foregoing their rights to be free
of warrantless searches in their homes because this may be the only
way to ensure that they have a place to live.217
The inclusion of a consent clause also raises the question of
whether conditioning the benefit of public housing on consenting to
warrantless searches is unconstitutional. The rule of "unconstitutional
212. The Guidelines say only that if violence in housing projects makes sweep searches
necessary, lease consent clauses "could be employed" to allow such searches. Reno Letter, supra
note 19. In his speech announcing the Guidelines, President Clinton stated that the decision
whether to put the clauses in the leases would be up to the tenant association. Radio Address,
supra note 18, at 823. The Senate endorsed a version of the Guidelines that explicitly Indicated
that tenants would not be forced to sign consent clauses as a prerequisite for living in public
housing. Id. Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros has indicated that making signing the consent
clauses a condition of obtaining public housing is "constitutionally complicated and probably
impossible." Michael Briggs, C-IA, CisnerosRelent on Search Consent, CHI. SUN-TIsMEs, May 5,1994,
at 56. The Attorney General's office as well has indicated that making public housing
conditional on consent is problematic. Id. At least one commentator believes that access to
public housing should be conditional on consent to the searches. See Rob Teir, Residents Want
Chicago Sweeps, PLAIN DEALER, May 7, 1994, at 7B (arguing that CHA policy is reasonable
response to increasing gang violence).
213. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing police coercion through force or
threats of force).
214. Bustamontp, 412 U.S. at 228.
215. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (explaining that Court can
take into consideration sex, race, age, and education of consenter to determine whether consent
was voluntary); Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248 (stating that schooling and intelligence are factors
to consider in determining if consent was voluntary).
216. Se. Housing Authorities Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 310, para. 10/2 (Smlth-Hurd 1993)
(describing need for public housing).
217. See Nat Hentoff, Top-Level Trio Overlook the Law in Seeking Security, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEws, May 9, 1994, at 37A (calling lease consent provision "yellow dog contract"); fill, supra
note 63, atAl (reporting that HousingAuthority figure believes tenants would feel pressure to
sign clause to gain access to housing); Projects and Police Raids, supra note 49, at A14 (likening
asking tenants to waive rights to being compelled to abstain from going to church or voting).
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conditions" states that the "government may not grant a benefit on
the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right,
even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether."
21 8
Although the Court has been inconsistent in its application of this
rule, the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine should be applied in
this case.
219
In Garzity v. New Jersey,' the Court considered a New Jersey
statute that required police officers to choose between testifying in
criminal proceedings, regardless of whether the testimony would be
self-incriminating, or losing their jobs." t The Court held that this
choice between the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate
218. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitional Condions, 102 HARV. L REV. 1413, 1415 (1989);
see also Wyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309,329 (1971) (DouglasJ., dissenting) ("ITihe rule is that
the right to continue the exercise of privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend
upon the grantee's submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the
provisions of the federal Constitution.'" (quoting United States v. Chicago, Mu., St. P. & Pac.
R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931))); Garrity v. NewJersey, 385 US. 493,500 (1957) (explaining
that state may not condition constitutional rights "by the exaction of a price*); Richard A.
Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Conset 102 HAV. L RnV. 4. 7
(1988) (defining unconstitutional conditions doctrine as rule that state cannot grant benefit
"subject to conditions that improperly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of
constitutional rights"); Kenneth J. Levit, Campaign Finance Reforn and the Rdurn ofBuckley v.
Valeo, 103 YALE LJ. 469, 479 (1993) (defining unconstitutional conditions as doctrine that
.prevents those who control the public fisc from using that power to extract objectionable
waivers of constitutional rights").
219. See Epstein, supra note 218, at 10-11 (noting that unconstitutional conditions doctrine
"tenaciously endures" despite fact that Supreme Court selectively invokes it); [eWit, supra note
218, at 482-83 (indicating that Court has seemed to retreat from doctrine in some contexts but
that it still may be applied in cases where "threats to coerce waher" are present); Sullhin. supra
note 218, at 1415-17 (explaining that Court is inconsistent in its application of rule of
unconstitutional conditions).
The Supreme Court has considered one case in which a state conditioned a public benefit
on a home visit by a state agency. In Wyman v.James, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a New York regulation that made visits to the homes of recipients of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) a condition of recehingAFDC benefits. Wyinan v.James, 400 U.S.
309,310-13 (1971). The Court, however, found that home visits did notfitwithin the definition
of search under the Fourth Amendment and thus were not proscribed under the Fourth
Amendment. i at 318. The Court recognized, however, that the visits possessed "some of the
characteristic of a search in the traditional sense," id., but reasoned that the home visits were
merely"a reasonable administrative tool" and were not"an unwarranted invasion of privacy" and
thus did not violate Fourth Amendment requirements. Id. at 326. Therefore, the Court avoided
altogether the "unconstitutional conditions" rule, holding instead that the home visits could be
justified under the administrative inspection exception to the Fourth Amendment. Id.
The factual scenario in 1'man is very different than the one under consideration in this
Comment. Under the Clinton Guidelines the benefit of public housing may be conditioned,
not on a non-intrusive visit by a government worker, but on a full-scale criminal-tpe search for
guns. The Fourth Amendment protections are greatest when the search in question is a full-
scale search in the home. Sesupra Part IfA (explaining that warrantless searches of home are
presumptively unconstitutional). Thus, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is more
applicable in the context of the searches in question.
220. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
221. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,494 (1967).
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oneself222 and relinquishing one's job was coercive and would
"water[]-down" the police officer's constitutional rights. '23  The
Court emphasized that "[t]here are rights of constitutional stature
whose exercise a State may not condition by exaction of a price."
24
The suggestion is similar in this case in that housing authority
officials could read the Guidelines as suggesting that they require
tenants to forego their Fourth Amendment rights in order to receive
the benefits of public housing. Such a condition puts a person
seeking a low-income apartment in a similar, and perhaps more
unacceptable, position as the police officers in Garrity. The condition
forces the tenant to choose between giving up Fourth Amendrhent
rights or foregoing an opportunity to have an affordable place to live.
As previously mentioned, this type of condition is coercive because
living in public housing is a necessity. Thus, the condition leaves the
tenant with no real option but to sign the clause.22
Furthermore, to condition consent to search on receiving public
housing creates a "constitutional caste" in which individuals who do
not have to live in public housing have more rights than those who
do.228 Tenants who cannot afford private housing will have "wa-
222. U.S. CONSr. amend. V (stating that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself").
223. Gar7ity, 385 U.S. at 497, 500.
224. X at 500.
225. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that conditioning
unemployment benefits on worldng on Saturday was unconstitutional because it compelled
waiving of religious freedom); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528.29 (1958) (holding that
California law conditioning property-tax exemption to veterans on signing oath of allegiance to
U.S. Government was unconstitutional encumbrance of "the constitutional right to speak");
Levit, supra note 218, at 483-84 (explaining that Court uses strict scrutiny to determine whether
unconstitutional conditions exist when programs employ "threats to coerce waiver" of
constitutional rights). But see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196, 201 (1991) (holding both that
regulation prohibiting Title X project from engaging in abortion counselling as method of
family planning is not unconstitutional condition because grantee is not being denied benefit
but merely is required to use funds for purpose authorized, and that regulations do not
"impermissibly burden" women's right to abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980)
(finding that government can decline to subsidize abortions through Medicaid program); Snepp
v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1980) (finding CIA employment contract that
conditioned employment on agreement not to publish or disclose classified or other information
without prior approval valid).
226. Sullivan, supra note 218, at 1421, 1490. Sullivan explains that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine should prevent "discrimination among right-holders who would otherwise
make the same constitutional choice, on the basis of their relative dependency on a government
benefit." Id at 1421. Professor Sullivan discusses three distributive concerns raised by
conditioning a government benefit on giving up a constitutional right: (1) such conditions
"alter the balance of power between government and rightsholders" allowing government to
encroach on "[p]referred constitutional liberties"; (2) they "skew the distribution of
constitutional rights" depending on who does or does not comply with the condition; and (3)
they create a "caste hierarchy in the enjoyment of constitutional rights." Id. at 1490; se also
Smith, supra note 6, at 544 (charging that sweep searches tell society at large that tenants of low-
income developments are "somehow lesser dtizens than the rest of us"); Michael Briggs, Housing
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tered-down" fights under the Constitution because they will be forced
to forego their Fourth Amendment rights.2 7 Meanwhile, wealthier
citizens who can afford private housing will enjoy full Fourth
Amendment protections. The rule against unconstitutional conditions
should bar such a redistribution of constitutional rights.'
Finally, assuming that a tenant voluntarily signs a lease with such a
clause, what happens if at the time of the search the tenant objects to
the search? How long is consent valid? Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence dictates that consent to searches must be voluntarily
given.2" If an individual who has voluntarily consented to a search
later explicitly withdraws that consent, any search conducted
thereafter would no longer be pursuant to voluntary consent 23 0 For
example, if, at the time of a search, a CHA tenant refuses to consent
to a search of his home, any search conducted subsequently is not
carried out pursuant to voluntary consent, regardless of whether the
tenant previously signed the lease consent clause. In this context, a
signed consent clause would allow authorities to conduct consent
searches as long as the tenant does not explicitly object to the search
at a later time. But if the tenant does object, the authorities would
no longer have the authority to search without first obtaining a
warrant or unless another exception to the warrant requirement
applies.
The Clinton Guidelines also address the issue of exigency searches.
The Guidelines define searches made under the exigency exception
as "searches of individual units where there isjustification for a search
but insufficient time to obtain a judicial warrant."23 Three points
are important to consider in the context of the Guidelines' exigency
exception discussion. First, this provision makes clear that when
conducting warrantless exigency searches, the housing authority must
conduct these searches at the time the emergency situation occurs, or
shortly thereafter. 1 2  Such provisions are based on the principle
Plan Shifts Emphasis OffHgh-Re CHi. SuN-TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, at 3 (reporting that ACLU
representative feared that conditioning public housing benefits on signing consent clause vould
make tenants "second-class dtizen[s]"); DeNeen L Brown, Tenants &Pros, Gonsin ClintonAnti-
Cime Plan, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1994, at B7 (reporting tenants' doubts about effectiveness of
searches and anger at being treated differently because they live in low-income housing).
227. Ganity, 385 U.S. at 500.
228. See Sullivan, supra note 218, at 1506 (stressing that without unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, there will be unacceptable hierarchy of right.holders).
229. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (stating that courts look to "totality of
circumstances" to determine voluntariness).
230. See supra notes 9095 and accompanying text (discussing withdrawal of consent).
231. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
232. See Payton v. NewYork, 445 US. 573,583 (1980) (noting that exigency exception does
not apply to cases "in which there was ample time to obtain a warrant!).
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that speed is an essential consideration when considering warrantless
searches under the exigency exception.23 Second, by emphasizing
that housing authority officials may conduct warrantless searches of
individual units rather than the CHA's reference to all units, the
Guidelines narrow the type of search permissible.
Third, the Guidelines never directly state that officials must have
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search based on exigent
circumstances. Rather, the Guidelines note that exigent searches may
only be made where there is "justification for a search."2 4 This
provision suggests that officials must have specific reasons for
conducting warrantless searches under the exigency exception.
Nevertheless, the Guidelines fall short of creating a constitutionally
valid option upon which housing authority officials may rely. By
indicating that the authorities must have a "justification" rather than
using the precise standard-probable cause-the Guidelines remain
unclear. Because the Guidelines do not explicitly require probable
cause for a warrantless search under the exigency exception, the
Clinton Guidelines may lead officials to believe that they may perform
warrantless searches whenever they deem that a valid justification
exists. 21 This ambiguous statement of Fourth Amendment princi-
ples could result in housing authorities violating the tenants'
constitutionally protected right to privacy.
IV. RECOM MNDATIONS
The failure of the CHA's sweeps policy to meet Fourth Amendment
standards indicates that housing authorities in general may benefit
from the Clinton administration's advice as to how to develop policies
directed at dealing with the problem of violence in housing develop-
ments without intruding on the constitutionally protected privacy
rights of tenants. In the context of searches, however, such guidance
will only be effective and workable if it explicitly delineates the Fourth
Amendment principles relating to searches of a home. In its current
form, the Clinton Guidelines do not provide such guidance. Instead,
other housing authorities following the Guidelines may find them-
selves in a predicament similar to the CHA, with policies that do not
pass constitutional muster because they violate the privacy rights of
their tenants. Therefore, this section suggests ways in which the
233. See supra Part IH.B.2 (outlining exigency exception).
234. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
235. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining that when exigent circumstances
exist, police may conduct warrantless search only if they have probable cause).
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Clinton administration should revise its Guidelines to explicitly deal
with identified constitutional problems.
Moreover, the Clinton administration should reevaluate its emphasis
on warrantless searches as a solution to the gun problem and violence
in the housing developments. Emphasis on sweep searches seems
misplaced for two reasons. First, the Guidelines compel an opprobri-
ous trade-off between the tenants' Fourth Amendment privacy rights
and their interest in living in a safe environment. Tenants should not
be forced to choose between being safe in their homes and their right
to privacy in their homes. Second, the searches are not truly effective
or practical as a long-term solution to the safety problems in the
developments; rather they are mere "'glitzy, superficial quick fixes"
to the problem.' This section recommends that the Administra-
tion concentrate on other less intrusive measures, designed to make
the developments more secure on a daily basis, that do not impinge
on the tenants' constitutional rights. In addition, this section suggests
that the Administration, as a means of developing long-term solutions
to the problem of violence in the developments, should encourage
tenants and community leaders to get involved in creating programs
aimed at making the projects safer.
A. Revise the Guidelines
1. Delete language implying special needs exception
The Clinton administration should rewrite the Guidelines, taking
out the emphasis on the special needs exception to the warrant
requirement. Language indicating that the options provided in the
Guidelines are constitutionally acceptable because of the "extraordi-
nary circumstances" or because a majority of tenants support them
should be deleted .1 7 As discussed above, the special needs excep-
tion to the warrant requirement is not applicable to the full-scale
searches of homes that the Guidelines recommend.' Thus, the
Administration should not lead housing authority officials to believe
erroneously that their authority to search the homes of the tenants is
236. Terry, supra note 4, at A12 (quoting Thomas P. Sullhan, attorney for tenants group
supporting sweeps); see also Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792,796 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(denouncing sweep searches as ineffective and not long-term solution to safety problem); Smith,
supra note 6, at 540 (arguing that searches redistribute rather than eliminate crime and are
actually harmful to government interest in safety); Don't Trasa Conti*ion in Zeal to Rgt C r_
USATODAY,Apr. 13,1994, at8A (noting that sweep searches conducted duringsummer of 1993
produced only 24 guns and that searches had little effect on reducing %iolence).
237. Se Reno letter, supra note 19.
238. See supa notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
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somehow enhanced because of the problem of guns and violence in
public housing, or because of the fact that many tenants support the
searches.3 9 Instead the Administration should provide housing
authority officials with realistic and truly constitutionally valid options
for conducting searches for guns in the projects.
2. Clarify that signing consent clause is not a condition of receiving
public housing
The Administration should clarify its recommendation concerning
the placing of consent clauses in leases. Specifically, the Administra-
tion should include explicit language in the Guidelines advising
housing authorities that signing such clauses should not be a
condition of receiving public housing.
Moreover, to ensure that consent is voluntary, the Guidelines
should encourage housing authorities to inform tenants of their
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches.240
Although such information is not an essential element in determining
whether consent is voluntary, it is relevant to this determination, and
is especially appropriate where citizens are being asked to surrender
their constitutional rights in advance of the actual search.241 In
addition, the Guidelines should recommend that housing authorities
explicitly inform tenants that they do not have to sign the consent
clause. Finally, the Guidelines should clearly explain to the housing
authorities that a signed consent form, in the face of an explicit
withdrawal of consent at the time of the search, does not authorize a
warrantless search. 2
3. Recognize that searches are not administrative
The Administration should replace the language in the Guidelines
that characterizes the searches for illegal guns as administrative
inspections and the language that suggests that such searches can be
minimally intrusive. 41 Instead, the Guidelines should include a
specific description of the scope of the searches and clearly indicate
239. See supra text accompanying notes 188-91 (explaining why argument that making
developments safe justifies warrantless searches is dangerous).
240. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (acknowledging that
knowledge of right to refuse consent may be factor in determining voluntariness).
241. See supra Part I.B.1 (noting factor considered in "totality of circumstances" is whether
consenter had knowledge of right not to be searched).
242. See United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that consent
may be withdrawn).
243. See supra notes 158-67, 194-206 and accompanying text (discussing problems with
characterizing sweep searches as administrative searches).
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that these searches will be conducted for law enforcement purposes.
For example, the Guidelines should explain that searches for guns
inevitably include inspecting drawers, cabinets, refrigerators, etc., and
that the weapons seized may be used as evidence in a criminal
conviction.' Furthermore, the Guidelines should explain that the
Fourth Amendment requires the housing authority to obtain vrarrants
to conduct invasive law enforcement searches of homes, unless they
have the consent of the individual tenants or exigent circumstances
exist.
4. Clarify exigent searches section
The Clinton administration should revise the section concerning
exigency searches to include a definition of probable cause and an
explanation of exigent circumstances.24 For example, the Guide-
lines should explain that probable cause to search exists when the
facts and reliable information would convince a reasonable person
that the apartment in question contains the item sought, e.g., an
illegal weapon. The Guidelines should also make clear that the
housing authority's police must have probable cause to suspect the
presence of illegal weapons for each apartment in which they conduct
an exigency search and that exigent circumstances do not justify
apartment-by-apartment sweep searches. 24 6  Furthermore, the
Guidelines should spell out when exigent circumstances exist. They
should explain that the housing authority's police may perform
exigency searches only when time makes obtaining a vrar-nt
unworkable or impractical, i.e., when the police are in hot pursuit of
a suspected criminal, when an immediate search would prevent the
escape of a suspect, or when waiting would create a dangerous
situation for the police, the tenants, and/or the public at large.
B. Reevaluate and Change Emphasis of Guidelines
In attempting to find constitutionally acceptable means of "main-
tain[ing] order and combat[ting] gang violence in ... housing
projects," ' the Clinton administration tried to fit warrantless sweep
244. The language that the Senate endorsed goes a long way in sohing this problem. The
Senate called the searches "apartment-by-apartment police searches for illegal weapons and
illegal drugs." 140 CONG. REC. 4663 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994).
245. Seesupra note 75 and accompanying text (describing how courts define probable camuse).
246. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (noting that police may not conduct
apartment-by-apartment searches without probable cause as to each individual apartment).
247. See supra Part ILB.2 (discussing immediate need to act asjustification for uurrantleSs
search).
248. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
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searches within the exceptions to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. In effect, the Administration implies that
warrantless searches are the best way to make the housing projects
safer.249 The premise underlying this approach is that the searches
are such an effective means of eradicating violence that the
government's interest in these searches is stronger, and indeed
outweighs, the tenants' constitutionally protected right to privacy. As
the analysis above indicates, the constitutional barriers to warrantless
sweep searches of low-income housing projects are numerous.
50
Furthermore, such searches are not particularly effective in eradicat-
ing or even lessening the violence in the projects. 51  Thus, the
Administration should reevaluate its emphasis on the warrantless
searches and begin concentrating on finding more effective and less
intrusive means of dealing with the problem.
1. Provide more effective security in developments
The Administration should focus on how to provide better security
in the housing developments to prevent guns and violence from
infiltrating the housing projects in the first place. The Guidelines
acknowledge this problem by noting that the "housing authority
[must] gain control of building lobbies and common areas."252 The
Guidelines recommend that housing authorities achieve this goal by
erecting fences around the buildings, conducting searches of packages
and clothing, and installing metal detectors at the entrances.5 3
Currently, however, the developments do not even have adequate
security in the buildings.' The security guards watching the
entrances are often underpaid and unprofessional, and are easily
susceptible to intimidation by gun-carrying tenants and intruders.5
249. See Reno Letter, supra note 19 (asserting that crime conditions may make unit
inspections essential).
250. See supra Part III.B (identifying constitutional concerns created by Clinton Guidelines).
251. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (explaining that sweeps are not effective at
solving crime problem).
252. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
253. Reno Letter, supra note 19.
254. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 796 (N.D. 111. 1994) (explaining that
lack of resources prevents CHA from providing adequate security to guard entrances and "patrol
common areas in and around buildings"); Less 'Swep,'More Protectionfor CHA, CHi. ThIB., Apr.
11, 1994, at 16 (noting that residents of CHA projects need "ongoing police protection" not
sweep searches); Terry, supra note 4, atA12 (explaining that ACLU and attorney for tenants who
support sweeps agree that providing adequate security force in developments would be more
effective than sweeps).
255. See Grossman, supra note 68, at 22 (insinuating that CHA's housing developments lack
"professional, well-trained law enforcement officers in sufficient numbers" to keep projects safe);
Mark Pratt, Instead of Sweeps, CHA Should Clean Up Its Ac, Cm. SUN-TIMEs, Mar. 31, 1994, at 82
(commenting that security guards are paid little and therefore will not risk their lives attempting
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The Administration, therefore, should first concentrate on getting
more resources allocated to housing authorities so that the authorities
can hire professional, tventy-four-hour security for the develop-
ments.
256
2. Encourage creative alternatives to searches
Instead of encouraging housing authorities to persuade tenants to
endorse warrantless searches, the Guidelines should invite housing
authorities and tenant associations to explore other less intrusive
means of dealing with the problem of guns in the projects. For
example, President Clinton has recently promised that the Administra-
tion will fund programs in the developments, such as midnight
basketball leagues, as a way to keep kids off the street and aray from
gang activity.' 7 The Administration should follow through on this
promise. In addition, the Administration should invite tenant
associations and community and business leaders to work together to
find ways to eradicate crime and to revitalize the developments.'
President Clinton has stated that the Administration would help
tenants form patrols to survey public areas and elevators. 9 The
President should also actively encourage programs that provide
incentives to gun owners to turn in their guns. Several communities
to stop individuals from taking weapons into building).
256. Apparently HUD and theJustice Department gave $30 million to 67 public housing
developments for the purpose of "beeffing] up security and facilities." Ana Puga, Ulntons rlsit
Housing Complex, In Chicago, President Deliv Pitch for Aicrim eBd B OSTON GLOBE, June 18,
1994, at 53.
257. Radio Address, supra note 18, at 823.
258. One interesting idea for revitalizing the projects is being pursued by the Chairman of
the CHA. He has been working on a plan to transform the developments by 'income mixing,"
which is "the experimental replacing of many low-income project residents with working- and
middle-class families." Stephen Braun, AewLifeforNoorsHig-Ri.?: FbrwefuHousingChifSays
He Can Raum-ect Chicago's Cabrini.Grcen Profer Vincent Lane Must ISn Over Many Doubtess
Including Wary Tenants. LA. TImE,June 2,1994, atA1. The idea behind this plan is that, if the
developments are redeveloped or tom down and rebuilt, they will become attractive to middle-
income families who are looking for low rents and high safety and maintenance standards. Id.
These new higher-income tenants then will "provide a human safety net for their poor
neighbors," becoming role models and helping lower income tenants find jobs. 1d; tz aLso
Jeffrey McCracken, Trying to Build a Brighter V1sion for Public Housing, CRAN'S SMALL BUS. DEr.,
Jan. 2, 1995, at 21 (describing proposed plan by community activist and architecture firm to
revitalize 500 unit public housing project in Detroit and to add day care services and better
security).
259. Radio Address, supra note 18, at 823; se Calvin Baker, A Different Beat; New Patrol
Introduced in Complkexs TIMES-PIcAYuNE (New Orleans), Feb. 6, 1995, at Al (describing New
Orleans' new "CommunityOriented-Policng-Squad" as community police force focused on
preventing crime in public housing developments); Darryl Fears, Urban Spot 'ghI, ATLA'rAJ. &
CONS., Nov. 26, 1994, at 6 (characterizing resident patrols of public housing developments as
.godsend[s] for public officials" and explaining that although they have had some success in
scaring drug dealers away, they face serious obstacles, such as being treated with suspicion by
fellow tenants).
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around the country have developed exchange programs in which
citizens are invited to exchange guns for such items as toys, groceries,
or sports or concert tickets.2" Such programs have the potential to
help make the developments safer by encouraging individuals to turn
in guns while at the same time providing an avenue by which the local
community can become actively involved in solving the safety
problem.
CONCLUSION
The tenants of the CHA projects deserve to live in a safe environ-
ment, but achieving the goal of safety should not come at the cost of
eroding constitutional rights. Indeed, safety from violence and liberty
from official invasions of privacy should be linked goals rather than
opposing ones. Yet, the CHA and the Clinton administration have
characterized the privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment as an impediment to obtaining safety in the developments. In
doing so, they have sent a dangerous message. As Justice Marshall
wrote: "History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to
endure."26' In an attempt to provide a quick and relatively cheap
solution to the enormous and immediate safety problems faced by
residents of low-income housing developments, the CHA and the
Clinton administration seem willing to tell low-income tenants that,
under certain circumstances, their constitutional rights are too
extravagant to protect.
The Clinton administration should revise its Guidelines to articulate
and meet constitutional standards. More importantly, however, the
Administration must recognize that safety in the housing projects and
protection of civil liberties are not mutually exclusive. In so doing,
the Administration must reevaluate the wisdom of emphasizing
invasive searches as a means of eradicating violence in the develop-
ments. The Administration should instead explore and adopt other,
less intrusive and more effective means of making public housing safe.
260. See Emily Adams &John Pope, City's Offer May Smoke Out Firearms, L.A. TIMES (Home
Ed.), Apr. 7, 1994, at J3 (describing Long Beach program where citizens could exchange
firearms for $100 grocery certificates at local markets and pointing to similar programs
throughout the country in which guns were exchanged for concert tickets in Los Angeles, toys
in New York, and hockey tickets in Orange County); Rebecca Trounson, Police Net 104 Guns in
Ducks Ticket Swap, L.A. TIMES (Orange County Ed.), Feb. 20, 1994, at Al (describing succes of
program to exchange guns for hockey tickets).
261. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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